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This study aims at examining the different frames used by the governmental newspaper 
“Al Ahram” and the independent newspaper “Al Masry Elyoum” in covering anti-Coptic attacks 
in Egypt from 2011 till 2017, under two different ruling regimes. The researcher conducted a 
content analysis of 553 news stories that were published a week after each attack. The researcher 
aimed at exploring the different frames used by each newspaper, whether those frames have varied 
along the different ruling periods, or across different newspaper ownership. The study has also 
examined the frame context used by newspapers to frame the attacks and the dominant news 
sources attributed by journalists in the coverage of the attacks. The study has further examined 
how the different news sources affected the type of frame, and finally the impact of different ruling 
periods on the attribution of blame. The results have shown that both newspapers relied mostly on 
the morality frame in their portrayal of the attacks. The results have further indicated that the use 
of some frames like the morality frame, the conflict frame and the economic consequences frame 
have not differed across both newspapers. The first has been the mostly used and the latter has 
been the least used. However, the attribution of responsibility frame has been used more by the 
independent newspaper, while the war on terror frame has been used more by the governmental 
newspaper. The use of frames have also differed across different ruling periods. For instance, under 
Mubarak’s regime, the attacks were framed using the morality frame; while under Sisi’s regime, 
the attacks were framed using the war on terror frame. The results have also shown that the overall 
frame context in the press coverage of the anti-Coptic attacks has been the thematic frame. 
Previous research has indicated an increase in the use of official sources, since they are perceived 
as the most credible sources. The findings of the study support those findings, since official sources 
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have dominated more than half the coverage. The research has further indicated that some sources 
played a significant role in framing anti-Coptic attacks. As for the attribution of blame, the findings 
suggest that under Mubarak’s ruling period, the blame was mainly on foreign agents, while under 
Sisi’s ruling period, the blame was pointed at terrorists. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“In a civilized society, diversity in religious orientation should be the reason for celebration, not 
the cause for hatred and differentiation.”  
                                (Abhijit Naskar, Illusion of Religion: A Treatise on Religious Fundamentalism) 
 
Recently, terrorism has earned and continues to earn a great deal of media coverage, 
especially after the September 11 attacks in USA (Zeng and Tahat 2012). As a result, various 
media scholars have been interested in examining the press coverage of terrorism and terrorist 
attacks (Zeng and Tahat 2012). Moreover, as the threat of terrorism is increasing, the public’s need 
for extensive information is also increasing in order to reduce their concerns about the issue and 
its danger (Zeng and Tahat 2012). Therefore, a lot of media research has been dedicated to 
examining whether the media provide accurate and unbiased information when they are reporting 
terrorism issues (Zeng and Tahat 2012). The importance of examining the press coverage of 
terrorist attacks is owing to the significant role played by press in creating the public perception 
about the incident (Zeng and Tahat 2012). For example, News editors determine which issues are 
considered more prominent through controlling the position and prevalence of topics (Zeng and 
Tahat 2012). Furthermore, journalists are able to impact the salience of the topic, as well as its 
content, by using certain news frames to highlight certain aspects of the story and neglect others 
(Zeng and Tahat 2012). Accordingly, examining the news frames and the agenda in press coverage 
of terrorist attacks is essential in order to understand how the public perceive those events (Zeng 
and Tahat 2012).  
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Although the media is supposed to provide “a forum for the society’s diverse segments” and 
fulfill the role of the public watchdog, it is still difficult to perform both functions in a society that 
has great sociopolitical struggle, or a battle between religious and secular forces (Evans and 
Kaynak 2015). Additionally, despite the fact that many studies have focused on examining the 
relationship between the media and terrorism, there are still a few studies that have focused on 
examining media coverage of terrorism in the Arab and Muslim countries that are witnessing 
intensifying terrorism and violence against Coptic Christians. 
1.1 The Egyptian Copts under Mubarak’s Regime 
Under Mubarak’s regime, there were various inefficiencies in the Egyptian secular model, 
where the quality of secular protection was deemed as superficial and declining (Farha and Moussa 
2015). Moreover, the administration at that time was constantly inciting violence towards the 
Coptic minorities in order to shift the attention of the public from criticizing the regime.  This has 
reflected a discrepancy from the view that Mubarak was the protector of all of the Egyptians (Farha 
and Moussa 2015). Brownlee (2013) has further added that when the violence against Copts 
intensified, Mubarak took this Coptic insecurity to his advantage. He used it to emphasize the rule 
of law and expanded his authoritarianism. Ironically, Mubarak has based his regime “as the 
firewall against sectarianism” instead of focusing his efforts on creating equality between Muslims 
and Christians. He has claimed that without his administration, the Copts would have been left to 
the hands of Islamist, anti –Coptic regime (Brownlee 2012).  
According to Tadros (2013), the nature of attacks against Egyptian Copts in Mubarak’s era 
has been different from the communal violence that has occurred under Sadat’s rule. This is due 
to the fact that the sectarian violence has spread to include the Copts’ private businesses, besides 
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the Coptic places of worship. Such attacks have been initiated by Islamic militants in areas that 
differ from the ones they came from. Thus, they have been viewed as “aliens” in the communities 
that they erupt (Tadros 2012). Tadros (2013) has further added that Under Mubarak, religious 
intolerance became internally diffused rather than externally induced. Thus, indicating that the 
social relations between citizens by that time was characterized by religious polarization.   
By the 1990s, Mubarak’s security forces succeeded in repressing Islamic radicals of “al-Jamaa 
al- Islamiyya” who targeted foreign tourists, regime officials and Egyptian Copts (Brownlee 2012). 
This authoritarian rule has claimed to save the Copts from the “Islamic threat”. Meanwhile, the 
same forces that have destroyed the Islamic radicals, represented a threat to Egyptian civilians 
(Brownlee 2012). Rowee (2009) has further explained that the rise of conflicts and violence, as 
well as the coercion and repression of the regime’s Islamist advocates, is a prominent trend that 
has indicated an “increasing insecurity of an authoritarian regime determined to maintain 
monopoly on power”.  
Brownlee (2012) has indicated that under Mubarak’s era, the regime has partially played a 
role in incidents that killed more Christians than any anti-Coptic attacks in the Egyptian modern 
history. For example, in 1998, security officials of “el Kosheh” town were responsible for torturing 
hundreds of Copts during the investigations of the murder of two other Copts (Brownlee 2012). 
Moreover, in 2000, there was a fight between two merchants in El Kosheh village, one was Muslim 
and the other was Coptic (Brownlee 2012). The majority of Kosheh citizens were Copts by that 
time, so Muslims from nearby villages headed towards El Kosheh to fight Copts (Brownlee 2012). 
The fight has resulted in destroying the Copts’ homes and stores, in addition to attacking the local 
Copts (Brownlee 2012). The fight has also resulted in killing Twenty Copts before the intervention 
of the ministry of interior (Brownlee 2012). Mubarak’s security officials reacted to the incident by 
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exacerbating the Copts and abandoning the scene when the conflict escalated (Brownlee 2012).  In 
addition to that, the Egyptian Copts who endured assaults have not found justice in courts as the 
perpetrators of the Copts in Kosheh incident have not been convicted (Brownlee 2012).  
Additionally, in 2010, two other deadly attacks against Egyptian Copts took place (Brownlee 
2012). In January, there was an attack on Coptic worshipers in Naga Hammadi, where six Copts 
were shot in Christmas Eve as they left the church (Brownlee 2012). Moreover, a Coptic man was 
shot down by the police in “Al Omraniya” in a conflict over building a church on a land that was 
basically licensed to be a community center (Brownlee 2012). Like all the previous incidents, the 
government’s reaction was denying that the incidents’ motive can be sectarian (Tadros 2013). The 
government even blamed the incidents on “foreign fingers” that probably aimed at provoking 
uprisings, hoping that these incidents’ file would be closed as soon as possible so that the state 
could continue promoting the image of Egypt that is characterized by “national unity” (Tadros 
2013).  
Other anti-Coptic attacks that took place under Mubarak’s regime were in 2011. There was a 
massive explosion at Saint Mark and Pope Peter’s (The two saints) Coptic Church in Alexandria 
that happened due to a car Bomb (Brownlee 2012). The attack has resulted in killing 23 Christians, 
and injuring dozens of other Christians, while shattering the regime’s claim of keeping the Copts 
safe and secure (Brownlee 2012). According to Brownlee (2012) “The New Year’s attack exposed 
Copts’ continuing vulnerability, despite living in a security state with a powerful chief executive 
and a sprawling Ministry of Interior. Egyptians were horrified and outraged. Security officers have 
not only failed to intercept the bomber, but they also stood by afterwards as Christians and Muslims 
scuffled in the surrounding area”.  
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In brief, the status of Copts under Mubarak’s regime was indifferent throughout the years. By 
that time, Mubarak and his government officials have seemed to only be interested in preserving 
their power rather than protecting Egyptian Copts (Brownlee 2012). Moreover, Tadros (2013) 
suggested that the series of anti-Coptic attacks in Mubarak’s era indicate an ongoing pattern of the 
government’s failure to handle the attacks, prevent their occurrence, or even provide a useful 
resolution to such conflicts. 
 
1.2 The Egyptian Copts post Mubarak’s Era 
According to Tadros (2013), the mass protests that have been led by Egyptian Copts after the 
bombing of “The Two Saints Church” in Alexandria, in addition to other political, economic and 
social factors have altogether paved the road for the 25th of January uprisings. Various Egyptian 
Copts have organized and participated in the revolution, despite the opposition of the Coptic 
Church by that time (Tadros 2013). Moreover, the Egyptian Copts have constituted a big part of 
the Egyptian revolution, where both Muslims and Christians were “Unified by a common goal to 
rid the country of Mubarak. Egyptians were able, for eighteen days, to put aside religious prejudice 
and construct a socio-political culture that was inclusive and pluralistic” (Tadros 2013). 
After Mubarak has been ousted, the Islamists started to attest the story of the revolution, 
excluding the role of Copts, the youth, and the liberals, proclaiming themselves as the “guardians” 
of the revolution (Tadros 2013). Moreover, in the days that followed Mubarak’s ousting, the Tahrir 
Square’s mood and spirit has completely changed in apparent ways (Tadros 2013). The main stage 
has been set by the Muslim Brothers, who denied access to the youth coalitions that led the 
revolution (Tadros 2013). Additionally, the slogans have even changed from “raise your head high 
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you’re Egyptian” to “raise your head high you’re a Muslim”. They have, also, changed from 
“madaniyah, madaniyah” to “islamiyah, islamiyah” (Tadros 2013). The Islamists have even 
literally thrown the Copts out of Tahrir square (Tadros 2013).  
The Egyptian Copts have been isolated and endangered even after the ousting of President 
Mubarak and during the few months post the revolution. According to Brownlee (2012), the few 
months post Mubarak have witnessed a wave of kidnappings to the Egyptian Copts, which revealed 
their continuous vulnerability even after the revolution. Since the officials of Mubarak’s regime 
have deliberately set confined prisoners free in an attempt to disrupt the uprising, the country’s 
public security has totally collapsed by that time (Brownlee 2012). The Copts of Upper Egypt were 
then the easiest targets since they were the weakest class in Egypt and they were not protected by 
the state (Brownlee 2012). By that time, Various Egyptian Copts in Minya, Sohag, Asyut and Qena 
were abducted and kept until their families paid ransoms (Brownlee 2012). Ironically, the state 
was encouraging the Christian victims to reconcile with the kidnappers instead of prosecuting 
them, which has indeed left Christians more vulnerable (Brownlee 2012).  
More violent attacks against Copts were committed in March 2011, where there was a fight 
between Muslims and Copts in “Atfeeh, Helwan” that has resulted in setting a church on fire, and 
thirteen people died while protesting over the arson (Brownlee 2012). Furthermore, in May 2011, 
there were clashes between Copts and Muslims in “Imbaba” over the rumor of “an interfaith 
marriage”, which resulted in the death of four Copts and nine Muslims, in addition to setting two 
Churches on fire (Brownlee 2012). Consequently, thousands of Copts rushed in front of “Maspero” 
and camped out for several days, demanding that the “Supreme Council of the Armed Forces” 
(SCAF) ensures the security of the Copts and the Coptic churches (Brownlee 2012). The 
“Maspero” Massacre was one of the most famous violent attacks against Copts post the revolution. 
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Once again, in October, and after a church in Aswan was set on fire; the Copts rushed in front of 
“Maspero” again demanding their safety (Brownlee 2012). Before reaching the building, the large 
vehicles of the army broke into the crowd, and thugs started to barrage them with projectiles from 
nearby rooftops (Brownlee 2012). During that time, the state television was claiming that the 
protesters initiated violence, and were inciting their audience to take the SCAf’s side, and the army 
reacted to the incident by claiming that their soldiers have panicked (Brownlee 2012). 
Additionally, instead of taking the soldiers into court, the protestors have been accused and have 
been taken for military trials (Brownlee 2012).  
According to Tadros (2013), post Mubarak’s era has paved the way for a more peaceful 
relationship between the Islamists, who were by that time getting closer to power, and the Coptic 
citizens. By that time, the Islamists made several attempts to ensure that the Egyptian Copts would 
enjoy their full rights of security if they came to power (Tadros 2013). On the other hand, when 
“Morsi”, a member of the Muslim brotherhood, came into power, other anti-Coptic attacks took 
place (Brownlee 2012). For example, in April 2013, five Copts were shot and killed in “al-
Khusus”, at greater Cairo (Brownlee 2012). The attacks at “Al khusus” continued as mourners 
spread rushed to St. Mark’s Church in Abbasiyah (Brownlee 2012). The state security reacted by 
sending a large group of thugs in a siege to those who gathered to mourn the victims (Brownlee 
2012). 
In summer 2013, the former Egyptian president “Mohamed Morsi” was removed from office, 
and Egyptian Copts were under the rule of a new president but with the same old problems. 
According to Aras and Bardakci (2014), the violence against Egyptian Copts has only seemed to 
increase, and Egypt has been witnessing the strongest wave of militant violence since the 1990s. 
The prosecution of jailing Copts has increased, and Christians became more insecure since they 
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were viewed by Islamists, who were furious about the church supporting the military, as 
“scapegoats” (Aras and Bardakci 2014).  
Brownlee (2013) has further added that the state’s indifference and the Islamists’ grievances 
have fueled more violence against Christians. For example, in July 2013, a church was 
intentionally set on fire in south “Al Minya”, and another one in “Marsa Matrouh” was vandalized 
(Brownlee 2013). Furthermore, four Copts were beaten to death by a mob, who also destroyed 
twenty four Copts’ properties in the village of “Nag Hassan” near “Luxor” (Brownlee 2013). In 
some cases, the Islamists were the ones responsible for such acts; however, according to Brownlee 
(2013), the “law official enforcement often enabled the attacks”. For example, after the incident 
of “Nag Hassan”, the head of security of “Luxor” government said that it is not the police’s duty 
to intervene and prevent killings, but it is rather to investigate after the incident (Brownlee 2013). 
Not only did the attacks against Coptic churches and properties increase after Morsi, but also cases 
of kidnapping Copts increased. According to Brownlee (2013), another two Copts were kidnapped 
in “Northen Sinai” in July 2014, and were then slaughtered because their families did not pay the 
ransom.  
 On December 11th, 2016, the Coptic Cathedral in “Abbasiya” witnessed a suicide bombing 
where, according to Africa Research Bulletin (2017), 26 Copts were killed and more than 45 Copts 
were injured while attending the usual Sunday prayers. The Egyptian Copts were then furious 
about the lack of security measures, and protestors broke out, clashing with security services, and 
demanding the removal of the Minister of Interior (Africa Research Bulletin 2017). Afterwards, 
there have often been concerns about the increased discrimination against Copts in Egypt (Africa 
Research Bulletin 2017). 
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     In April 2017, the president “Abdel Fattah Al Sisi” declared a three months state of emergency 
after a series of simultaneous attacks targeting Christian worshippers in “Tanta” and “Alexandria”. 
According to Africa Research Bulletin (2017), 27 Copts were killed and at least 78 were injured 
in an explosion that took place in “Saint Goerge” church in “Tanta”. A few seconds later, 17 Copts 
were killed and 48 were injured in a second explosion at “Saint Mark’s Cathedral” in “Alexandria” 
(Africa Research Bulletin 2017).  
      The Copts in Egypt have always suffered from the state’s failure to ensure their security. 
Though they have gone under the spectrum of various leaders, some anti-Islamists like Mubarak 
and other elected Islamist like Morsi, and finally, the military rule of president Sisi; still all of these 
leaders have not efficiently contributed to their safety. 
1.3 The Research Significance 
 The print media plays a significant role in framing and constructing the issue of religious  
Sectarianism (Mohieddin et. al). Various scholars have argued that the print media can 
sometimes be used as a means for promoting peace (Jan and Khan 2011). There have been 
various efforts to endorse the use of journalism in facilitating conflict resolution (Jan and Khan 
2011). When the journalists report conflicts objectively, become impartial when they portray the 
parties involved in the conflict, and become submissively watchful when it comes up to 
promoting peaceful means of resolving conflicts without taking sides; this can be referred to as 
“peace journalism” (Jan and Khan 2011). 
While the press can contribute to improving the relationships between different religious 
comminutes through promoting religious tolerance, it can also have a negative impact when it 
reinforces stereotypes that might encourage violence against religious minorities (Mohieddin et. 
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al). It is also worth noting that until a very recent time, the media was not allowed to publish 
issues related to religious minorities, which could be interpreted by the Copts as being biased 
(Mohieddin et. al).  Furthermore, when the press discuss the issues of sectarian violence, it can 
provide a profound analysis of the underlying gaps in the rights of religious minorities, or it can 
further conceal them through inaccurate, biased or misleading coverage (Mohieddin et. al).  This 
can, in turn, affect the public’s attitudes towards religious minorities, and can also affect the 
public policy for better or worse (Mohieddin et. al).  
 
 An ample amount of research has been done to examine the press coverage of terrorist attacks. 
On the other hand, when it comes to anti-Coptic terrorism, especially in the Middle East, 
information relating to how the press portrays anti-Coptic attacks is inadequate. Therefore, this 
study draws on the framing theory and uses the content analysis methodology to analyze how the 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Defining Terrorism and its Causes 
The previous literature about terrorism has shown that scholars have not yet agreed on how to 
define the term itself, although they all agreed that political groups have been using it for almost 
two thousand years (Lentini 2008). Furthermore, there is no consensus among some bureaucracies 
of individual states as to how to define terrorism (Lentini 2008). For example, in the United States, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Department of Defense 
have different definitions of what constructs terrorism, according to the operation and the areas of 
competence of each (Lentini 2008).  
According to Lentini (2008), terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon; thus, unsurprisingly so 
many agencies are involved. He has also added that “It shares many qualities with military and 
paramilitary groups’ actions, as well as criminal organizations and activities”. Likewise, Lutz et. 
al (2005) have argued that there are over one hundred definitions for terrorism designed for 
different purposes such as being used in the court law, or for reaching international consensus 
regarding an ambiguous task. Furthermore, they defined terrorism as an act which “relies on 
violence or the threat of violence to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the 
immediate victims of the violence”. On the other hand, Hoffman (2006) has demonstrated that 
terrorism is all about power; “the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power 
to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence or, equally important, the threat of violence 
used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim”. Previous studies have not only 
addressed how to define terrorism, but have also tried to articulate its causes. Basuchoudhary and 
Shughart (2010) have noted that religious, ethnic and linguistic polarization within a country 
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increases its susceptibility of being victimized by terrorist groups. They have also added that such 
polarized countries are more likely to encounter domestic violence and civil war. Moreover, the 
historical analysis of the terrorist waves around the globe can be tracked by the ethnic disputes 
created before the First World War (Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010). In fact, the release of the 
religious and ethnic separation in Central Asia and the Middle East upon the downfall of the Soviet 
Union has provided better understanding for the reasons behind modern terrorist activities 
(Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010). 
Additionally, Kurrild-Klitgaard et. al (2006) have suggested a positive correlation between 
religious and ethnic fragmentation, on one hand, and the terrorist activities on the other hand. They 
have argued that creating religious and ethnic tensions and emphasizing differences among groups 
cultivates the outrage which results from the feeling of being discriminated and underprivileged in 
the status quo. Thus, other religious and ethnic groups direct domestic violence as a means to 
capture power (Enders and Sandler, 2006).  
In an attempt to examine how ethnic social fragmentation fuels terrorist attacks, Ozdogan 
(2008) suggests that the rational actors, who manipulate the religious and nationalistic sentiments 
and the socioeconomic conditions, change the ethnic social fragments into separated and polarized 
forces to serve their own agendas. For example, the Turkish leadership manipulates the 
socioeconomic dispossession of impoverished Kurds, Al Qaeda manipulates religious sentiments, 
and the Nazis manipulate their community’s nationalistic sentiments (Ozdogan 2008). If the state 
fails to defend the rights of its ethnic groups; then, it will help those rational actors to maneuver 
these ethnic differences to serve their own agendas (Ozdogan 2008).  On the other hand, 
Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) suggest that institutions have a significant role in dampening 
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ethnic fractionalization. The devaluation of the governmental laws can fuel violence against 
minorities and foster the breakdown of the social order (Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010).  
Overall, religiously and ethnically fragmented countries are found to be more susceptible to 
be victimized by terrorist attacks. While rational actors can manipulate such fragments to serve 
and foster their own ideologies, strong institutions can avoid the negative consequences of these 
fragments by preserving the rights of the minorities.   
      
2.2 Terrorism and the Media 
Terrorism scholars, such as Bruce Hoffman, has explained the relationship between terrorism 
and the media, illustrating that they are “bound together in an inherently symbiotic relationship, 
each feeding of and exploiting the other for their purposes” (Qtd in Banlaoi 2009). Since Media is 
believed to be the main channel that links the terrorists to their audience, Margret Thatcher, the 
former British Prime Minister, has explained that the media to the terrorists acts as “the oxygen” 
to their publicity (Banlaoi 2009).  In other words, there is a mutual relationship between the media 
and the terrorists, to the extent that terrorists would have invented the media if the media were 
nonexistent (Banlaoi 2009).  
 According to Papacharissi and Oliveira, terrorist attacks maintain the sympathetic elements 
of news such as relevance, drama, and sympathetic visuals, which makes them more newsworthy 
(2008). In the past, and even in the new era, terrorist organizations have been aware of these news 
values, which increases their efficiency in exploiting news agencies to foster their agendas 
(Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). It has been further argued that media coverage of terrorist attacks 
is essential, as it represents the social context of terrorist attacks and “confers status” consequent 
to the terrorists’ causes (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). Moreover, Patrick (2014) has argued 
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that since media influences how people make sense out of events, it also benefits the “rhetorical 
needs of terrorism”. Similarly, Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008) have further explained that news 
coverage is important to terrorists since it affects how their acts are perceived by the audience. 
Thus, the “rhetorical progression” of the terrorist attacks’ coverage impacts “the level of 
demonization or glorification that ensues for various parties within the public”. This means that 
the audience’s perception of terrorism and terrorist attacks is impacted by the “rhetorical biases” 
of the press that covers the terrorist attacks. 
According to Surette et al (2009), the focus on portraying terrorist attacks has been increasing 
in the contemporary era. It has developed from merely reporting and covering the event and its 
consequences, to exerting more effort in tracking those radical groups to achieve a closer depiction 
of their targets and strategies. Furthermore, BadrEldin (2014) has explained that the reason behind 
such focus on terrorist groups and terrorist attacks might be that it serves the political goals of a 
certain party. For example, some political parties attempt to demonize the opposing ones through 
depicting them as terrorists (BadrEldin 2014). 
The relationship between the media, terrorism and the government can be illustrated in what 
Morin described as a “symbiotic relationship” where the three work together to achieve their goals 
(2016). The media outlets demand ratings to be able to withstand the high competition in the news 
industry, while the terrorist groups need the media to publicize their acts and activities, to maintain 
their goal of frightening and terrorizing the public; while finally the government seeks advocacy 
and rapport to their policies to fight terrorism (Morin 2016).  
The role of the media in news coverage of terrorism has gained much attention in the new era, 
especially after the September11 incident (Iqbal 2008). Iqbal (2008) has further explained that the 
world is on the way to experience a new era in the relationship between media and terrorism, in 
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which one of the main targets of the terrorist groups is to gain publicity for an event or a cause, 
and the media overreacts in responding to this target. He has even argued that “terrorism as a form 
of communication has become an important part of contemporary discourses on terrorism and 
conflict communication” (Iqbal 2008). Hence, the media acts as the perfect publicity and 
propaganda tool for terrorists and their causes.  
 Various scholars have found it compelling to study the relationship between the media, the 
society and terrorism, especially after the huge increase in terrorism activities across the world. 
According to “The US Department of State”, terrorist attacks across the world have increased by 
35% between 2013 and 2014. The total number of terrorism victims has also increased by more 
than 80% (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of 
Statistical Information, 2015). Bearing this in mind, examining the role of the media in 
disseminating and propagating such trends is still considered a new field of research (Fahmy 2017).   
The previous literature on terrorism and the media has relied upon the traditional approach of how 
the media shapes and amplifies terrorist attacks, and has broadened the scope to include examining 
how the media communicates terrorism issues. For instance, there have been studies that examined 
media effects of exposure to terrorism issues that reaches local and global audience. Other studies 
have examined the role of the media in covering terrorism issues, as well as the different patterns 
in terrorism news coverage. Moreover, there have also been studies that examined the relationship 
between online mass surveillance in preventing terrorism.  
 The role of terrorism images in restoring and healing solidarity in the local and global 
media arena has been analyzed by Berkowitz (2017), where he applied a semiotic lens and 
conducted a qualitative analysis of blogs and news reports that were related to Brussels’ terrorist 
attacks in 2016. In his study, he has found that photographs, in addition to cartoons and anchoring 
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texts, have the ability to construct global solidarity to fight terrorism. He has also emphasized the 
importance of anchoring, explaining that it is essential for the decoding process, especially in 
global photographs and cartoons, since they are not easily accessible to broader audience. 
Gizzard et. al (2017) have taken a further step in examining the role of images, challenging 
the common wisdom which holds that media violence results in antisocial outcomes. Their 
empirical study examines whether visuals that include graphic violence lead to prosocial reactions, 
like the increase in moral sensitivity. The authors have conducted two experiments using news 
footage of the mass execution that was organized by The Islamic State Group (ISIS). The findings 
of the study suggest that graphic media violence can sometimes act like what they refer to as “a 
moral motivator”. The strong anger and disgust responses that are stimulated by the high level of 
violent visuals yield a strong motivation to put an end to this violence.  
Other scholars have alarmed us about the threat that terrorism news hold on civil liberties. 
For example Stoycheff et. al ( 2017) have conducted an online experiment to examine the 
relationship between the audience’s perception of online surveillance and their support for other 
exceptional measures to prevent terrorism. The results of the study suggest that the audience’s 
perception of government monitoring result in higher support for the foreign policy that restricts 
online and offline civil liberties of others, including the rights to a fair trial and freedom of speech.   
 There have also been studies that are concerned with the relationship between terrorism coverage 
and attitudes towards outgroup members. For example, Sikorski et. al (2017) have examined 
whether terrorism coverage that directly links terrorism to Islam, or the Islamic State Group (ISIS), 
may induce fear in non-Muslims. They have also studied the effects of news differentiation 
between Muslims and Muslim terrorists through conducting a controlled experiment. The results 
of the study suggest that terrorism news that does not differentiate between Muslims and Muslim 
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terrorists result in negative outgroup perceptions about Muslims. The scholars have even suggested 
that such perceptions might further lead to intergroup conflicts between non-Muslims and 
Muslims. That is why the authors have highlighted the importance of differentiating clearly and 
explicitly between Muslims and Muslim terrorists in terrorism news. They have further argued that 
news differentiation would result in “a better informed and a less hostile environment”.  
The impact of terrorism news on reactions toward outgroup members has further been 
examined by Tamborini and Hofer (2017). They have used the proposition of the model of intuitive 
morality and exemplars, which “regards moral judgment as the result of intuitive affect”, to test 
the effect of terrorism news coverage on the salience of prosocial behavioral intentions and moral 
intuitions towards outgroup members. To test their hypothesis, they have conducted an experiment 
where participants have been randomly assigned to watch either news about the terrorist attack in 
Paris 2015, or a control news story. Later on, they have measured the salience of five moral 
intuition that are identified by the model of intuitive morality: fairness, loyalty, sensitivity to care, 
authority, purity, and the willingness to help outgroup members. The results of the study suggest 
that the exposure to terrorism news increases the salience of respect for authority, which in turn 
reduces the willingness to help outgroup members.  
 Other scholars have found it important to examine the general patterns and trends in 
terrorism news coverage. For example, Sui et. al (2017) examined the patterns of U.S terrorism 
news coverage across 15 years from 1998 to 2013, providing a longitudinal view. The study has 
been inspired by the recent terrorist attacks that are carried out by extremists such as the Islamic 
State Group (ISIS), who has continuously worked on ensuring a high media coverage especially 
among the western media outlets. The results of the study suggest that the U.S media are more 
likely to cover the Islamic State Group’s non-U.S events, however, they did not find similar results 
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for other prominent terrorist organizations. In other word, the findings suggest that the U.S 
terrorism news coverage are determined by the event’s proximity to and affinity with the United 
States, the number of U.S casualties, and weapons of mass destruction.  
Generally, the previous studies provide new insights and add to the wide body of literature on 
terrorism and the media. There is no doubt that in the current global society, terrorism does not 
have any borders (Fahmy 2017). Therefore, scholars have increasingly recognized how crucial it 
is to improve terrorism news coverage both domestically and globally (Fahmy 2017). 
      
2.3 Framing Terrorism 
     The journalist’s coverage of a particular event in the newspaper can influence and determine the 
audience’s perception about the event (Nevalsky 2015). One of the theories that has explained this 
phenomena is the Framing Theory. It illustrates that people possess a wide range of frames, in which they 
employ in the process of making sense of an event. Such frames later influence how these information are 
communicated and processed (Nevalsky 2015). According to Nevalsky, applying this theory to news 
coverage of events provide a better understanding of how frames used by journalists are able to influence 
the readers’ perceptions (2015). Nevalsky has further explained that each journalist convey a set of frames 
by keeping specific aspects of the reality in the background of the story, while stressing on other aspects 
(2015). Such frames can impact the audience’s attribution to an event or even stimulate a new belief, since 
journalists tend to promote a certain attribution and ignore others (Nevalsky 2015). An example of this is 
the American news coverage within the cold war era, which has been dictated by the cold war frame for 
various decades, to an extent that the importance of any international event was not determined by the 
event’s significance, but rather by the significance of the event in relation to the cold war (Nevalsky 2015).  
 According to Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), there are five main frames that journalists use 
in their news stories: 
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- Attribution of responsibility frame – where journalists convey an issue in such a way that 
attributes the responsibility or the blame of an issue to the government, a group, or an 
individual. 
- Conflict frame – journalists use this frame to stress on conflicts between groups, individuals 
or institutions. This frame is mainly used as a way to grab and maintain the readers’ 
attention.  
- Human interest frame – this frame emphasizes the “human impact” of the event. It focuses 
on dramatizing, emotionalizing, or personalizing the news, while bringing the human face 
of the event to the forefront of the story. 
- Economic consequence frame – journalists use this frame when they emphasize the 
economic consequences of the event on individuals or institutions, or even on the whole 
country.  
- Morality frame – this frame puts the event or the news into a moral or a religious context, 
through raising questions that offer certain moral judgments on how we should behave.   
 
Scholars have also conceptualized thematic and episodic frames through conducting content 
analysis of newscasts (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). They have concluded that issues are 
portrayed in a wider societal context in the thematic frame, while in the episodic frame, issues are 
represented in a narrower context that revolves around individuals (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). 
Previous studies on terrorism and the media have employed both thematic and episodic frames, 
whereby both endorse military actions and negative stereotypes (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). 
For example, a study that has been examining framing the September 11 attack in American 
networks has shown that the episodic framing has prevailed the coverage. The main focus has been 
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on the crime itself rather than its political and social conditions (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). 
Furthermore, other scholars have suggested that the media sometimes focus on “global macro 
frames” when they report political conflicts, like for example the cold war frame (Falkheimer and 
Olsson 2015). These macro frames portray specific foreign events as global problems, while 
suggesting and recommending judgments about the events, in addition to fostering certain policies 
as a solution (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). 
After the terrorist attacks in the United states in 9/11, scholars have observed the evolution of 
a new macro frame, the “war on terror frame”, which has the ability to relate local conflicts to 
international conflicts (in the September11 case, it has been linked to Al-Qaeda) (Falkheimer and 
Olsson 2015). It has been further argued that such frame is often used by the media, in addition to 
the government, to justify military actions, policies, and strategies in combating their opponents 
(Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). Scholars have also explained that since terrorist attacks are always 
known for skepticism about the identity and motives of the terrorist, journalists use the “war on 
terror frame” in an attempt to answer the basic interrogation about the terrorist (Falkheimer and 
Olsson 2015).  
 
2.4 The Muslim-Coptic Relations in Egypt and Anti-Coptic Attacks 
The Middle Eastern society is characterized by its wide range of ethnic and religious 
communities. According to Zeidan (1999), these communities tend to “fissure in times of stress 
when primordial groups’ loyalties rise to the surface”. Many states in the region have been 
witnessing an utmost of the religious and ethnic apprehension of their fundamental groups in the 




In Egypt, the two sides of the sectarian divide are Muslim Sunnis and Coptic Christians 
(Zeidan 1999). The Muslim Sunnis have been the dominant group since the seventh century, and 
the Copts have been the subordinate group, who are being protected by “people of the book” 
(Zeidan 1999). Since then, the Copts have been enduring a transformation in relations with the 
Muslims, “as periods of tolerance were interspersed with times of persecution” (Zeidan 1999).  
It is clear that the relationship between Muslims and Copts in Egypt is very complex, with 
deep historical and modern problems, as well as roots that are shrouded in traditional articulation 
(Zeidan 1999). In the Pre-modern era, the Muslim-Copts relations have relied upon the way the 
ruling elites identified Egypt, either an independent “Nile-valley entity”, or a part of the Sunni 
empire (Zeidan 1999). In this era, there have been conflicting views about Egypt’s core identity 
(Zeidan 1999). Some seeing it as “Western secular-liberal nationalism; others seeing it as 
“pharaonic-Egyptian nationalism”; “Islamic-Arabism”; “Pan-Islamism”; or “Pan Arabism” 
(Zeidan 1999).  Each one of these views implies a different perspective of the Copts’ position in 
the Egyptian society (Zeidan 1999). For example, when the liberal and Secular Arab identities 
have been the dominant ideology, the Egyptian Copts could pursue equality, since it has been seen 
as an authentic part of the Egyptian identity (Zeidan 1999). On the other hand, when the Arab-
Islamic and Pan-Islamic identities have prevailed, the Egyptian Copts were rusticated to a 
subordinate status (Zeidan 1999). 
Tensions and conflicts are typical in all societies with multiple communities (Zeidan 1999). 
Despite the flexibility of religious and ethnic identities, that are continuously reestablished as soon 
as the majority and minority conform to the changing contexts, religious variations do create 
conflicts and constitute more impenetrable barriers than linguistic, tribal and ethnic differences 
(Zeidan 1999). The period of Imperialism in the latter half of the twentieth century was the time 
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when the existence of “the non-Muslim Arab communities” grew to become a significant political 
issue (Tamura 1989). By that time, the imperialists took advantage of the various social and 
cultural variations among the groups which they have conquered. They started charging hatred 
among them by emphasizing the heterogeneousness of the society in order to foster social 
fragmentation (Tamura 1989). From that time on, the issue of national unity has become one of 
the most important social and political issues that countries have been facing (Tamura 1989). Some 
theories have even implied that the historical origins of the issues of the minorities have roots in 
political systems that are developed through the leading coercive force, or in other words, the 
process of forming a “nation-state” (Tamura 1989).  
       According to (Tamura 1989), the era of British imperialism was the first stage of the Muslim-
Coptic conflicts in Egypt, where the Muslims’ attitudes towards the Copts were provoked and 
triggered by the Danshaway incident in 1906.  Such incident, for the first time in the Egyptian 
history, created a conflict that was viewed as a serious political issue (Tamura 1989). The Second 
stage of the Muslim-Coptic conflict was when a Muslim radical assassinated Boutros Ghali, the 
Coptic Egyptian Prime Minister in 1910, in order to grant the British Empire the right to use the 
Egyptian Suez Canal until 2008 (Tamura 1989). This incident has fueled a conflict between “Al 
liwa” newspaper which defended the assassin and created an anti-Coptic campaign using offensive 
discourse, and the Coptic newspaper, “Alwatan” (Tamura 1989). The apprehension of the Coptic 
community has increased after the provocative campaign, urging them to dispatch representatives 
to Britain to call for protection, and for equality with Muslims who are the majority in Egypt 
(Tamura 1989). However, Sir Eldon Gorst investigated the issue and replied that the Muslims and 
Copts have been living peacefully together, and that separating the Copts and treating them as a 
“separate community” would make the situation worse (Tamura 1989). Such negligence from 
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Britain, added to the feeling of the Copts’ isolation, forcing them to assemble an “All-Coptic 
Congress” in 1911 where they gathered a total of 1158 Coptic representatives in “Assiut” to call 
for The Copts’ equality with Muslims (Tamura 1989). The congress has resulted in mass protests 
of both Muslims and Copts, as well as frequent riots and harassments at that time (Tamura 1989). 
In response to the “All Coptic Congress”, the Muslims initiated an “All-Muslim Congress” in 
Cairo, where they decided to deny the Copts’ demands (Tamura 1989). Although the relationship 
between Muslims and Copts was deteriorating in 1911, it got better and stronger with the Egyptian 
nationalist movement post the Second World War, where they endorsed the slogan of “Egypt for 
Egyptians”, and all the complications of the Muslim-Coptic relations were immersed in the 1919 
revolution (Tamura 1989).  
The tension between the Muslims and Copts has risen again during President Sadat’s era, 
which has ended up in Sadat’s assassination in 1981 (Tamura 1989). It has all started with the 
incident of “El Khanka” village, where the Coptic Bible society’s village was set on fire by an 
unknown person (Tamura 1989). Afterwards, the Church delegated priests to the village, and 
organized mass protests to express their frustration (Tamura 1989). The Muslims’ response has 
not stopped at organizing similar mass protests but they have also gone as far as destroying the 
Copts’ houses and buildings in the “Khanka” village (Tamura 1989).  As a result, the government 
took advantage of the incident and interfered to take a measure, extending the presidential power 
under the name of protecting Egypt’s national unity (Tamura 1989). Such interference, however, 
did not stop Muslim radicals from burning various Coptic churches in Upper Egypt (Tamura 1989). 
Thus, Pope Shunuda III intervened to take a series of actions, where he held a delegation for the 
Coptic Church in Alexandria to inspect the situation (Tamura 1989). He also visited the USA for 
meeting President “Carter”. Afterwards, he enforced a fast to express his protest while sending 
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President Carter, Sadat and Vatican Pope to address the negligence of Copts’ human rights in 
Egypt (Tamura 1989). The Pope has even called for cancelling the Copts’ official Easter 
Ceremonies to express their discontent with the lack of Copts’ protection by the government 
(Tamura 1989).  
More Coptic Churches were burned in 1981 under Sadat’s rule, after the “Zawiyya Al 
Hamra’s” riots in Cairo, which started with a fight between neighbors and extended to a huge 
armed conflict between Muslims and Copts in the area (Tamura 1989). The Muslim radicals 
continued bombing Coptic churches by that time, and that was when president Sadat intervened 
and arrested 113 people from “anti-establishment elements” in order to restrain both Muslim and 
Coptic radicals (Tamura 1989). He further exiled Pope Shunuda III to “Wadi Al Natrun”, 
illustrating at the parliament that both Islam fundamentalists and Pope Shunuda represent threats 
to the Egyptian unity (Tamura 1989).  
There were hardly any changes in the Muslim-Coptic tension during Mubarak’s era 
(Zeidan 1999). While there were negotiations with “the Islamic moderates”, aiming at eradicating 
the radical extremists in Egypt; this, however, meant carrying on with the discriminatory acts and 
maintaining the same status quo (Zeidan 1999). The Copts, thus, remained anxious after the 
government’s violent repression of Islamists, and the disregard to the anti-Coptic attacks (Zeidan 
1999). Zuhur and Tadros (2015) have further added that Mubarak’s government did not take any 
measures to restrict the attacks against the Egyptian Copts or to ensure their security. Incidents 
where the Copts were attacked or assaulted went unpunished, which lead to a massive increase in 
the anti-Coptic attacks, with 37 attacks in 1992 alone (Zuhur and Tadros 2015).  
While Mubarak’s regime was violently repressing the Muslim extremists of the “Gamaa 
Islamiyya”, the government still attempted to Islamize the state. The media used Islamic rhetoric 
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at that time, which provoked the Copts even more, especially when the famous religious figure 
“Al sheikh Al Shaarawi” criticized and assaulted the Coptic beliefs (Zuhur and Tadros 2015).  This 
era has even witnessed the most prominent sectarian incident, “Al Kosheh” in 2000, which like all 
other attacks, started with minor conflicts then developed with rumors spread all over the place, 
causing an eruption (Zuhur and Tadros 2015).  According to Rowe (2013), this violent sectarian 
conflict has resulted in the death of at least 21 Copts. 
There were also several alarming sectarian incidents preceding the 25th of January 
revolution (Zuhur and Tadros 2015). For example, there was a shooting in 2010 which has killed 
seven Copts (Zuhur and Tadros 2015).  Moreover, in 2011, 23 Copts were killed in the Saint’s 
Church in Alexandria on New Year’s Eve as a result of a car bomb (Zuhur and Tadros 2015). 
Additionally, Rowe has (2013) illustrated that the attack stirred protests in “Shubra” districts in 
Cairo, which made the precarious conditions of Christians in Egypt the highlight of global news 
stories (Rowe 2013). Mubarak’s Government then condemned the attack, and announced that one 
of Al-Qaeda affiliates, based in Gaza, has been responsible for the attack (Rowe 2013). Rowe 
(2013) have further added that in March 2011 after the revolution, a Coptic church was destroyed 
in southern districts of Cairo, leading to Coptic mass protests. This has been due to the fact that 
the Copts realized that the armed forces were not effectively securing the Coptic places of worship 
in Egypt (Rowe 2013). The same week has further witnessed the burning of a Coptic church in 
“Imbaba”, by a group of Islamists associated with “Salafist” movement, resulting in the death of 
at least 15 Copts (Rowe 2013).  
While the Egyptian revolution has strengthened the bond between Muslims and Copts, 
more Coptic churches were set on fire under Abdel Fattah Al Sisi’s regime. On 11th December 
2016, an explosion took place in the small church of St. Peter and St. Paul (El-Botroseya), killing 
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at least 25 people, and injuring dozens of mostly Christian women and children while performing 
their Sunday prayer (Hadeer El-Mahdawy in AlAhram online 2016). According to Ahmed Morsy 
“The bombing was the deadliest attack on the Christian community, which makes up 10 per cent 
of Egypt's population, since a 2011 bombing killed 23 worshippers outside Two Saints Church in 
Alexandria” (Qtd. In AlAhram weekly). After the incident, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the Egyptian 
President, declared a national mourning period of three days, where he called for hunting down 
and punishing the criminals who were condemned for the attack (Cairo bombing: Cairo Coptic 
Christian complex hit 2016 in BBC news middle east). While all hands were mostly pointed on 
the Muslim Brotherhood, expecting them to be involved in the attack, since Morsi’s supporters 
blamed Christians for overthrowing Morsi; the Muslim Brotherhood denied to be involved in the 
attack (Ahmed Morsy 2016 in AlAhram weekly).  
The state funerals for the attack was attended by the Egyptian President, who showed his 
deep condolences for all Egyptians, and condemned “Mahmoud Shafik Mostafa” for blowing 
himself up with an explosive belt upon entering the church (Ahmed Morsy 2016 in AlAhram 
weekly). He also declared that “four others, three men and a woman, had been arrested in 
connection with the blast and the police was searching for two more suspects” (Ahmed Morsy 
2016 in AlAhram weekly). While on the other hand, two days after the attack, the Islamic state 
(ISIS) claimed responsibility for the church bombing, identifying that the bomber was “Abu 
Abdallah al-Masri”, yet the state failed to provide a clear explanation for such inconsistency (Nour 
Youssef 2016 in “The New York times”).  
There were also a series of simultaneous attacks against Egyptian Copts in 2017, where an 
explosion took place at “Saint George” church in Tanta and “Saint Mark’s Cathedral” Church in 
Alexandria. According to Africa Research Bulletin (2017), 27 Christian worshipers were killed 
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and at least 78 were injured in Tanta, while in Alexandria, 17 Christian worshipers were killed, 
and 48 were injured. President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi declared a three months state of emergency 
right after the attacks, which was approved by the parliament (Africa Research Bulletin 2017). 
According to Africa Research Bulletin (2017), the state of emergency was considered “the first of 
its kind” since the new constitution adopted in 2014. President “Abdel Fattah Al Sisi” has also 
announced that he would establish a higher council for fighting terrorism and extremism (Africa 
Research Bulletin 2017).   
     
2.5 The Egyptian Media and Anti-Coptic Attacks 
The development of independent press, as well as the deregulation of the Egyptian press have 
transformed the press coverage of Coptic issues and the conflicts between Muslims and Copts 
from a public taboo to the most preferred subject of the weekly and daily press (Elsasser 2010). 
Moreover, the discourse of Muslim-Coptic relations and Coptic issues has started to be dealt with 
in a sensational manner, portraying the violent incidents against Copts as “a simplistic equation 
between the extremists on both sides” (Elsasser 2010). Additionally, Elsasser (2010) has built on 
the idea that the changes in the media environment has contributed to a greater public awareness 
about the issues that the Copts face in Egypt. He has further noted that the increased media focus 
on the mutual distrust between Muslims and Copts has contributed to an aggravation of an already 
existent sectarian tension.  
Such propositions were based on the analysis of one of the most controversial and widely 
discussed sectarian incidents in 2008, “Abu Fana” monastery attack in Upper Egypt, where a group 
of tribesmen carried firearms and attacked the Coptic Orthodox monastery (Elsasser 2010). They 
destroyed the agricultural machinery in the land and burned the monks’ chapel and cells (Elsasser 
2010). They also tortured and abducted four monks, in addition to abusing them physically and 
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attacking their religious convictions by forcing them to spit on the cross and say the Islamic 
“shahada” (Elsasser 2010). According to Elsasser (2010), such attack is an example of how a 
simple crime, as well as mere conflicts over land and resources, can easily take the form of a 
sectarian discourse, because the media always tend to frame them in “religious terms”.  
In an attempt to examine the press coverage of anti-Coptic attacks, Elsasser (2010) has 
analyzed the governmental and independent newspapers’ coverage of “Abu Fana” incident. In his 
study, he has explained that governmental newspapers like al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Jumhuriyya 
and al-Masaa; have not given the incident much attention. For example, Al-Ahram newspaper has 
reported a short news story one day after the incident on the 29th page, entitling “Three people in  
Al Minia” suffer gunshot wounds in an attack by gangsters (baltagiyya)” (Elsasser 2010).  On the 
next day, they have changed the headline to “one Muslim killed and four Copts injured because of 
a conflict over land” (Elsasser 2010). Additionally, Al-jumhuriyya has reported on the front page 
on the same day “prosecution begins investigation of Malawi incident”, while dedicating an 
additional article inside the newspaper, highlighting the government’s efforts to alleviate the issue 
(Elsasser 2010). Finally, Al- Masaa has reported “The governor of “Al Minia” during his meeting 
with the people: what happened was a fight between two neighbors, the sons of Malawi are one 
fabric” (Elsasser 2010). Nonetheless, news about the attack has suddenly disappeared from the 
daily governmental newspapers three days after the incident (Elsasser 2010).   
On the other hand, the independent newspapers have awarded the incident major attention, 
highlighting the intensified tension in the Muslim-Coptic relations, as well as the government’s 
failure to restrain it (Elsasser 2010).  For example, Al-masry Elyoum and Al Dustor have focused 
on portraying the Copts’ demonstrations against the government in “Minia” (Elsasser 2010).  A 
few days later, they have shifted the focus to the history of the incident, and to Pope Shenouda 
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III’s reaction (Elsasser 2010). The “Abu Fana” incident remained the top priority of independent 
newspapers’ headlines for more than a week, treating the incident as in issue of national importance 
(Elsasser 2010).  Later on, independent press has started to shift the focus gradually ten days after 
the incident, until the issue disappeared in almost all the newspapers (Elsasser 2010).  Unlike the 
governmental newspapers, independent newspapers have carried out investigations on the issues 
between the monks and Bedouins to know more about the history and background of the conflict. 
They have also questioned the state security service’s and the police’s role in restraining violence 
(Elsasser 2010).  For example, a week after the incident, Al-Masry Elyoum has reported the 
detailed history of the issue, with the various violent incidents that took place over the prior three 
years (Elsasser 2010).  Likewise, the independent newspaper “Ruz Al-Yusuf” has dedicated two 
special reports to the incident, however, they were clearly biased towards the regime (Elsasser 
2010).  It is also worth noting that despite the fact that independent press has been trying to focus 
on important aspects of the event,  still it has been unable to unravel the contradictory information 
made up by the various parties; and instead, conformed to the common version of state 
representatives (Elsasser 2010).   
 
2.6    The research objectives  
This study aims to analyze the Egyptian press coverage of anti-Coptic terrorist attacks in 
Egypt. The study also aims to investigate whether the media coverage of anti-Coptic attacks has 
differed across the years and during different ruling periods.  Furthermore, the study targets to 
examine the relationship between the different media sourcing patterns and the coverage frames 
of anti-Coptic attacks. To this end, the study will analyze the coverage of four different attacks: 
the “Two Saints” Church attack in Alexandria in 2011, which was during Mubarak’s period; in 
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addition to the “Coptic Cathedral” Church attack in Cairo 2016, the “Saint George” Church 
attack in Tanta 2017, and finally the “Saint Mark” Church attack in Alexandria in 2017, under 
President Sisi’s regime. The study, also aims at examining whether the coverage frames used in 
governmental press differ from those in independent press. Therefore, the research will examine 
one governmental newspaper “Al-Ahram”, and one independent newspaper “Al-Masry Al 





CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 The Framing Theory 
Various scholars have argued that the content of the media plays a significant role in shaping 
the public’s perception of news events (Fahmy 2010). Yet, previous studies suggest that there is 
still no common theoretical model for framing, and there are still operational differences among 
scholars regarding the framing theory (Fahmy 2010).  Moreover, various scholars consider framing 
as a research program rather than a unified paradigm, which shows an overall unclear 
conceptualization for framing (Fahmy 2010).  In an attempt to operationalize the concept of 
framing, Reese (2001) has offered a definition for the framing process by suggesting that ‘Frames 
are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, which work 
symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world.’ His definition has congregated the 
ongoing active process of assigning meanings, which occurs within the framing process. It also 
emphasizes the relationships within the context which may change by time (Fahmy 2010).  
The general concept of framing was first introduced by Goffman (1974), where he suggested 
that people develop frames in their minds to help make sense of what they view or hear in their 
daily lives, a process that he referred to as the “schemata of interpretation”. Gitlin (1980), on the 
other hand, has described framing from a journalistic point of view. He has argued that frames are 
the tools facilitating the journalists’ organization and packaging of information to the audiences. 
He has viewed frames as determined patterns of interpretation, selection, cognition, significance 
and presentation that organize information for the audience as well as the journalists. Meanwhile, 
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Entman (1993) has concluded that the process of framing involves the selection of some features 
of perceived realities and making them more salient through the communication process to foster 
a specific interpretation or judgment among the audiences.  In other words, the process of framing 
can have significant implications on how the audience perceive an event, since frames emphasize 
certain features of reality and eliminate others; thus, suggesting different interpretations among 
individuals (Borah 2011).  
Various scholars have been interested in extensive tracking of communication frames in order 
to determine the trends in defining certain issues, in addition to examining variations in issue 
coverage across different media outlets (Chong and Druckman 2007). The reason why frames are 
so important in the communication field pertains to the fact that such frames have a huge impact 
on the attitudes and behaviors of their audiences (Chong and Druckman 2007). For example, the 
communication frames used by the media are then adopted by citizens, social activists and even 
politicians (Chong and Druckman 2007). Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) have further added that the 
importance of framing is pertains to the fact that it has an impact on both the societal and the 
individual levels. The individual level frame may lead to changing the audience’s attitude upon 
the exposure to specific frames, while the societal level frames can influence complicated 
processes like “political socialization and collective actions” (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012). It is, 
therefore, essential to examine such context of the framing process, since most of the time 
audiences have no direct experience with the significant events, and rely on the media to inform 
them and provide them with the orientation about the events to be able to construct rational 





3.2 The Process of Framing in Communication 
Framing is generally the process by which individuals construct or alter their interpretation of 
an issue (El-Haddad 2013). In the context of communication, scholars have explained that frames 
take place in the communicator’s mind; thus, influencing his decisions. They, also, take place in 
the communicated text and in the mind of the receiver who might or might not conform to the 
communicated frame (El-Haddad 2013). 
The media framing model has divided the process of framing into four main aspects: frame 
building, frame setting, individual level impacts of framing, and finally the societal level impacts 
of framing (Scheufele 1999). Frame building pertains to the main elements that impact the basic 
qualities of news frames (De Vreese 2005). Studies of frame building suggest that both internal 
and external factors in journalism can affect how news organizations and journalists frame news 
stories (De Vreese 2005). In other words, frame building refers to “the continuous interaction 
between journalists and elites”, which results in the frames manifested in the news stories (De 
Vreese 2005). On the other hand, frame setting pertains to the relationship between communication 
frames and the audiences’ prior judgments and knowledge (De Vreese 2005). Previous studies 
suggest that news frames influence the audience’s evaluation and interpretation of events and 
issues (De Vreese 2005).  
The consequences of communication frames can be analyzed from the individual level and 
the societal level (De Vreese 2005). The individual level consequences refer to the certain attitudes 
about an issue that have been changed upon exposure to certain frames, while the societal level 
consequences refer to the creation of processes like “political socialization, decision-making, and 




3.3 Framing and Media Bias 
 The audience tend to interpret the main events based on the information that they receive 
through frames, which in turn impacts how they react to such events (Stout & Buddenbaum, 2003). 
The news media frame such events through creating news stories which are the bi-products of not 
only the journalists’ perception of reality, but also the competition in the journalism market over 
attracting more audiences (Stout & Buddenbaum, 2003). The result of such “interrelated media 
norms” is what scholars refer to as “unconscious framing bias” (El-Haddad 2013). The frames in 
news stories are not caused by a counterplot against those who are negatively framed, but are rather 
caused by the fundamental news values that regulate what is newsworthy and what is not, and that 
determine how to frame issues; which sometimes result in a negative representation of certain 
groups or issues (El-Haddad 2013). For example, Boykoff’s (2006) study of framing social 
movements has concluded that news values such as personalization, drama, novelty, relying on 
official sources, and fragmentation result in producing shallow frames for the social movements. 
 Entman (2010) has further clarified the basis of media bias. He has illustrated that there are 
two relevant, but consolidated senses of the term: content bias, and decision making bias. Content 
bias involves “consistently slanted framing of mediated communication that promotes the success 
of a specific interest, party or ideology in competitions to control government power” (Entman 
2010). Demonstrating slant patterns that often stimulate support for groups who pursue power, and 
censure their opponents; refers to the existence of content bias (Entman 2010). The term “media 
bias” should only be employed when scholars demonstrate the constant repetition of slant over 
time in the most influential media outlets. This would consequently benefit interest groups in 
“consistently persuading people to accept interpretations helpful to the favored actor for some 
significant period” (Entman 2010). On the other hand, decision making bias refers to how 
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journalists’ beliefs impact the texts and the frames they produce (Entman 2010). Various scholars 
have explained that editors and journalists of different media outlets make their news decisions 
based on their personal ideologies, while unconvincingly denying such bias (Entman 2010). El-
Haddad (2013) has further added that “News slanting or content bias is the result of interaction 
between the perceived facts, the media skills of each side in the conflict, the three different kinds 
of decision biases, in addition to the event‘s context and audience schema”.  
 
3.4 The Impact of Media Framing  
Generally, there are two types of frames that are often identified in media framing effects 
studies: generic frames and issue specific frames (Bos et.al 2015). Generic frames refer to the 
common general patterns of journalistic reporting, while on the other hand, issue-specific frames 
are those specifically designed for a particular event or issue (Bos et.al 2015). Basically, all 
communication frames deliver a particular valence through proposing various arguments that are 
with or against an event or an issue (Bos et.al 2015). Consequently, such valence provides 
communication frame with the ability to impact both general attitudes and specific judgments 
about an issue (Bos et.al 2015).  
Research on media framing effects generally focus on the cognitive effects of framing, 
which is how frames employed by the media can impact the audience’s underlying attitudes and 
opinions (Bos et.al 2015). The previous literature on framing consider opinions as a sub-concept 
and conceptualize it as changeable beliefs that incorporate judgments and evaluations about a 
particular issue, whereas attitudes are considered more constant and general  predispositions of an 
individual about an issue (Bos et.al 2015). Scholars have also conducted a few studies on the 
behavioral effects of framing in the media, where they mainly focused on the impact of media 
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frames on political campaigns, voters’ turnout, and social movements (Bos et.al 2015). In these 
studies, researchers concluded that media frames can promote protests and political mobilization 
among individuals (Bos et.al 2015). 
Various scholars have also been interested in examining how the framing effects work. For 
example, Chong and Druckman (2007) have explained the difference between the moderating 
variables of framing, and the mediating variables of framing. The moderators are variables like 
individuals’ prior knowledge, individual values, credibility of the news source and the condition 
effect of framing (Chong and Druckman, 2007). On the other hand, the mediators are mainly “the 
psychological processes that mediate framing effects”, which are the availability, applicability and 
accessibility of frames (Chong and Druckman, 2007). El-Haddad (2013) have further added that 
there are other factors that moderate the effects of framing. In addition to individual values and 
beliefs, the intensity and the strength of the frame, as well as the characteristics of competing 
frames should be examined. Previous studies have suggested that both included and excluded 
frames are important to understand the framing effects (El-Haddad 2013). 
 
3.5 News Framing and Terrorist Attacks 
In an attempt to apply framing to the context of terrorist attacks, Papacharissi and Oliveira 
(2008) have argued that frames may be considered as a strategy for identifying the main cause and 
responsibility of terrorist attacks, while also suggesting rational judgments and policy reactions to 
them. That is to say, the frames that are used in the media to cover terrorist attacks, and those that 
are used by the government to report and react to these events, have a significant impact on how 
the society at large perceives the event (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). Furthermore, the frames 
that are adopted in a particular society about terrorist attacks are able to contextually shape their 
37 
 
definitions (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). For example, the thin line that differs between 
freedom fighters and terrorists is often “blurred across political regimes” (Papacharissi and 
Oliveira 2008). In other words, the actions of certain groups might be considered outrageous in a 
particular society, while in another society it might be seen as an acceptable action (Papacharissi 
and Oliveira 2008). Therefore, the way such strategies are framed has a significant impact on how 
such acts are perceived among individuals of the society (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). 
According to Hamdy and Gomaa (2012), the Egyptian news media tend to select, 
emphasize or exclude information, highlight certain features of one issue over the other, suggest 
moral judgments, and finally provide suggested solutions. Hence, it is important to examine the 
news frames adopted by Egyptian newspapers in the portrayal of anti-Coptic terrorist attacks, since 
the press plays an essential role in the public’s perception about the issue.  
 
3.6 The Different Types of Frames  
Scholars have classified media frames into the following: 
A) Individual frames and media frames 
Individual frames are the frames in thought, which are constituted by the determinants of the 
individual’s judgment; while media frames are communication frames, constituted by the 
interpretation and the organization of information presented by the sender (El-Haddad 2013). The 
media frames can be created by the government, the media, interest groups, politicians or even by 
the audience themselves (El-Haddad 2013). 
B) Thematic and episodic frames 
Research on framing has identified the difference between thematic frames, or frames that 
highlight the issue focusing on a broader context, and episodic frames, which focus on a specific 
38 
 
issue or case. Iyengar (1991) illuminates that the general schemas of thematic frames help provide 
insight for remarkable patterns of political communication and their impact on the attitudes of the 
audience. For instance, audience who are exposed to news stories that episodically frame an issue 
like poverty will more likely blame it on individual failure (Iyengar 1991). On the other hand, 
those who are exposed to poverty news stories that are framed thematically will blame the issue 
on the government failure (Iyengar 1991). 
C) Generic frames and issue-specific frames 
Media research has differentiated between generic frames and issue specific frames. Generic 
frames are frames that go beyond thematic limitations, and can be recognized with relation to other 
topics with different contexts; while issue-specific frames are frames that are only relevant to 
certain specific events or topics (De Vreese 2012). The issue specific frames do not enable 
researchers to generalize them to a set of issues or compare them across other issues, while generic 
frames enable researchers to discover patterns in news coverage of events (El Haddad 2013).  
 
3.7 The Sourcing Theory 
Since journalists often rely on news sources for information needed for their news stories, 
researchers have argued that sources have a great impact on the content of news stories.  According 
to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), the news sources are considered the “external suppliers of raw 
material” needed in the news making process. Furthermore, leuven et. al (2015) have referred to 
sourcing as the fundamental routine that journalists perform to access information, present various 
points of view, and also double check their facts. Since journalists are not always able to witness 
many events directly, they tend to rely on official and other mainstream sources in order to ensure 
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credibility, objectivity as well as productivity (leuven et. al 2015). On that account, researchers 
refer to sources as “the initial gate-keepers” of the gate-keeping process (Leuven et. al 2015).  
As the initial gate-keepers, news sources have the ability to eliminate certain information and 
choose which aspects to give the journalists at the end of the process (Leuven et. al 2015). Leuven 
et. al (2015) have, further, explained that the information emphasized or deemphasized by the news 
sources then have a direct impact on the way journalists report and present their news stories. In 
other words, news sources can directly affect how journalists frame issues and events (Leuven et. 
al 2015). Consequently, news sources “often become the news framers who offer or define themes 
or symbols that help journalists to make sense of the environment” (Leuven et. al 2015).  
 
3.8. The Use of Official and Elite Sources  
Researchers have listed five main categories of sources used in the media. These categories 
include: local government officials, international government officials, foreign private parties, 
private citizens and vaguely identified sources (Bashri 2012). According to Bashri (2012), even 
when the sources are vague or not identified, journalists can often replace them with one of the 
other sources listed in the five categories.  
Previous studies have found that journalists often rely on authoritative sources to cite them 
in their news stories since they hold credentials among the public (Hermida et. al 2014). Such 
credentials arise from powerful positions such as presidents, government officials, police officials, 
or even powerful businessmen (Hermida et. al 2014). For instance, in the United States, researchers 
have found that the news coverage is dominated by official and governmental sources, since they 
are perceived to be more credible among the public (Kim and Jahng 2016). As a result, such 
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sources are granted an influential position in the news decisions and the news making process 
(Kim and Jahng 2016).  
A wide range of case studies have provided empirical evidence that the media output is 
dominated and impacted by those who are in position of power. For example, when Iyengar and 
Simon (1993) analyzed the news reports on the Gulf war, they found out that more than 50% of 
the news stories have directly come from official spokespersons. Likewise, Manoff and Schudson 
(1987) as well as Sigal (1973) have noted that more than three quarters of the news sources were 
official institutions and government officials. Similarly, Wittebols (1996) has studied the US and 
Canadian news coverage of social protest, and has noted that the reliance on official sources have 
made the news coverage within a certain country in favor of the country’s government and policies. 
Moreover, Kothari (2010) has examined framing Sudan’s Darfur conflict and has found out that 
as journalists rely more on government official surces, the news stories seem to endorse their views 
while deemphasizing alternative views. 
  Other studies have examined the news sourcing in terrorism related news. For example, 
Palez et al. (1982) have examined the news sources employed by “The New York Times” in 
terrorism related news in the 1970’s. The study has found that almost 69% of the news stories 
included reports, quotations, or direct interviews from official sources, while only 21% of the news 
stories attributed sources with opposing perspectives. A few years later, Atwater and Green (1988) 
have carried out a content analysis to examine the news sources in television coverage of 
international terrorism. Surprisingly, the study has found that the US official sources have been 
given more time than non-US sources, even when the news was about terrorism outside USA. The 
study has also shown that 70% of the news stories attributed official sources while only 30% of 
the stories attributed other unofficial sources. Similarly, Wittebols (1995) has conducted a 
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comparative study, examining the difference in the sourcing patterns of the US and Canadian TV 
networks’ coverage of terrorism stories in the late 1980’s. The results of the study have shown that 
60% of all the news sources in both countries were official sources, and they were even granted 
longer segments than non-official sources.  
There have also been studies that examined the sourcing patterns in USA and Arab 
countries’ newspapers. For instance, Lee (2004) has noted that unlike the Arab newspapers, the 
US newspapers relied more on sources that support their perspective regarding war on Iraq. 
Moreover, when Kern (1979) analyzed NBC and CBS news coverage of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the results have shown that correspondents often quoted the US president, while 
downplaying other sources of foreign opponents.  
According to Matthews (2013), when journalists rely only on official sources, they risk 
providing unbalanced news coverage of terrorist events. This does not only produce less quality 
journalism, but also leads to the spread of fear and anxiety among the public about terrorism risks, 
since government officials often tend to exaggerate and use more weighty terms in describing the 
risks of terrorism. Moreover, Hickerson et. al (2011) have explained that even though reliance on 
official sources might appear to journalists as a good journalistic practice that ensures credibility, 
it might as well “come at the expense of other relevant voices that lack name recognition and 
access to power”. In other words, when journalists rely more on official sources, journalists 
provide a more abstract and compact version of what might be a concrete and diverse debate, 






3.9 The Relationship between Framing and Sourcing 
The previous literature on sourcing and framing has provided an empirical evidence that 
there is an association between the news source and the type of frame in news stories. According 
to Stromback et. al (2013), “Who gets to speak in the news ultimately decides what audiences may 
know from the news”. Consequently, there is indeed a relationship between the type of news 
sources, the angle of the news story, and how the issue is framed (Stromback et. al 2013). So, the 
loop goes on, the news sources impact the media frames, which in turn impact how the audience 
perceive the issue or event (Stromback et. al 2013). Researchers have explained that the goal of 
government officials is to be included in the news in order to influence the public through imposing 
their preferred frames (Stromback et. al 2013). At the same time, the journalists prefer frames that 
can grab the attention of the audience, and that are congruent with the public’s culture (Stromback 
et. al 2013). On that account, frames can sometimes function as one of the criteria of news selection 
and source selection (Stromback et. al 2013). That is to say, the news framing of events and issues 
is a “coproduction” of attitudes and behavior of both news sources and journalists (Stromback et. 
al 2013). 
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between sourcing and framing. For 
example, Peng Kee et. al (2012) have examined the role of news sources in the frame building 
process using a content analysis of Malaysian and Chinese daily newspapers. The results of the 
study have shown that the news sources have been more influential than the journalists themselves 
in the frame building process. For instance, the study has found that stories attributing 
governmental sources and “Barisan National” were more likely to use the attribution of 
responsibility frame. Meanwhile, the human interest frame has been more dominant in stories that 
attributed ordinary citizens.  
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Similarly, Cozma and Kozman (2014) have studied the association between sourcing and 
framing in the US’ elite newspaper coverage of the Syrian crisis. The findings of the study have 
shown that stories that attributed US official sources, international official sources, experts and 
other media sources have been more likely to use the conflict frame. The findings, also, suggest 
that the attribution of responsibility frame has been more dominant in news stories that cited 
president Obama and Syrian rebels, while the morality frame has only been dominant in stories 
that cited Syrian citizens.  
Another study has been conducted to test the relationship between framing and sourcing 
concerning the US and South Korean news coverage of the nuclear test in North Korea. In their 
study, Kim and Jahng (2015) have found that both the South Korean and the American newspapers 
have differently employed their sources in a way that supports certain frames. For example, stories 
that attributed US officials have been more likely to use security and economy frames. Meanwhile, 
stories that attributed South Korean officials have been more likely to frame the nuclear test as a 
strategy. Likewise, stories that attributed sources from other countries like China and Japan have 
been more likely to use the diplomacy frame. The study has, thus, concluded that the use of news 
sources in both newspapers have differed according to the frames chosen to impose certain 
interpretations to the nuclear tests.  
Bearing this in mind, it can be concluded that the process of framing in communication is 
not static. It is rather a dynamic process that takes place at many levels, depending on both the 
journalists themselves and their sources.  In other words, the journalists along with their sources 






CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
RQ1: What are the dominant frames incorporated by both newspapers in the press coverage of 
the attacks?  
RQ2: What is the major frame context in the press coverage of the attacks?  
 H1: The type of frame will differ according to the type of newspaper  
H2: Official sources will be quoted more than other sources in both newspapers  
H3: The type of frame in the news story will differ according to the type of source in each 
newspaper  
H4: The frames incorporated by both newspapers differ according to different governments  
H5: The attribution of blame will differ according to different governments   
 
4.2 Content Analysis 
This study deploys the quantitative approach of content analysis to investigate the 
Egyptian news’ framing of anti-Coptic attacks. The content analysis is a widely used research 
approach that examines media content to describe the communication content, asses and evaluate 
media messages, and compare them to the real world facts (Wimmer and Dominick 2011). 
Researchers have come up with various definitions to the content analysis approach, among 
which is Wimmer and Domick’s definition; which explains that content analysis is a “method of 
studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for 
the purpose of measuring variables” (2011). 
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4.3 Defining the Universe 
The study will be analyzing framing in one state-owned daily newspaper “Al Ahram”, and 
one independent daily newspaper “Al Masry Al Youm”. The researcher has intended to include 
both an independent and a state-owned newspaper in order to examine whether there will be a 
significant difference in the way both newspapers frame the attacks. The researcher has also 
refrained from including a partisan newspaper in the sample, as according to Atallah and Rizk 
(2013), the partisan newspapers have been recently highly controlled by the state, and have become 
“largely dictated by the interests of their respective affiliated parties”. “Al Ahram” has been chosen 
to be the governmental newspaper analyzed as according to Egypt Today (2017), it is the most 
selling state-owned newspaper. Similarly, according to the “Information and Decision Support 
Center of the Egyptian Government – IDSC, 2013”, Al Ahram has the highest circulation of almost 
190,000 copies daily. Elmasry (2011) have further explained that “Al Ahram” has been widely 
seen as the “representative of state-owned newspapers”. Furthermore, “Al Masry Al Youm” has 
been chosen to be the independent newspaper analyzed in the study as it enjoys high readership, 
in addition to having the highest circulation among independent newspapers, with almost 160,000 
copies daily (Information and Decision Support Center of the Egyptian Government – IDSC, 
2013).  
 
4.4 Sampling Method 
The type of sample used in this study is a non-probability purposive sample. The purposive 
sample is a type of non-random sample, whereby subjects who pertain certain qualities or 
characteristics are selected to be part of the sample, and others who do not meet those 
characteristics are eliminated (Wimmer & Dominick 2006). According to Miles and Huberman 
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(1994:27), purposive samples are the most commonly used samples in applied research. 
Researchers have also outlined various types of purposive samples but the most common 
characteristic among all types is that “subjects are selected according to predetermined criteria 
relevant to a particular research objective”. Therefore, the researcher has chosen to examine all the 
news stories that mentioned the attacks in “Al Ahram” and “Al Masry El Youm” newspapers, 
excluding the columns (opinion pieces written by a columnist in a side column of the newspaper), 
and editorials. This is due to the fact that they tend to reflect the ideology of independent 
individuals rather than the news agencies.  
The researcher has also set a sample duration of one week after each attack, since according 
to Jen-Shih et. al (2008), the media and the public usually do not focus on one specific issue for a 
long period of time. They have drawn on this approach from Down’s “Issue Attention Cycle” 
theory (1972), which referred to “the ups and downs of attention an issue receives either from the 
public or from mass media”. The theory implies that an issue goes through some stages until the 
public’s interest in the issue gradually declines, and then the issue gets replaced with another new 
one of concern (Jen-Shih et. al, 2008). Thus, the researcher suggests that the first week after the 
attack will be the week that receives the highest attention from both the media and the public. All 
the examined news articles have been retrieved from the archives of both newspapers.  
The study will analyze both newspapers’ coverage of the following attacks on the following dates:  
 The “Two Saints” Church bombing in Alexandria, from 1st January till 8th January, 2011. 
 The “Coptic Cathedral” Church bombing in Cairo, from 11th December till 18th December, 
2016. 
 The “Saint George” Church bombing in Tanta, from 9th April to 16th April, 2017. 
 The “Saint Mark” Church bombing in Alexandria, from 9th April to 16th April, 2017 
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The sample includes only one Attack that has occurred in 2011, during Mubarak’s era, since 
this was considered the first attack on Coptic churches in Egypt by that time. Afterwards, the 
Egyptian revolution took place, whereby Mubarak was ousted and Morsi came to power. Under 
Morsi’s regime, no attacks have occurred against Coptic churches in Egypt. On the other hand, 
when President Sisi came to power, more Coptic churches have been attacked on a regular basis. 
This is why the sample includes three attacks that took place under Sisi’s regime, while only one 
attack that took place under Mubarak’s regime.  
 
4.5 The Unit of Analysis 
Based on previous literature of framing terrorist attacks, the choice of the unit of analysis 
in the study is the news story that is related to the anti-Coptic attacks in both newspapers, including 
headlines and sub-headlines, and excluding photos. As mentioned by Papacharissi and Oliveira 
(2008, p. 54), it is important to examine news frames incorporated in such news stories, since they 
reflect the media’s ability to depict the reality of others, and to place more emphasis on a favored 
interpretation and less emphasis on the less favored one. The headlines will, also, be examined, as 
according to (Pan and Kosicki 1993), the most powerful framing device in the news story is the 
headline.  
 
4.6 Coding Categories and Operational Definitions 
Since the results of content analysis can be easily influenced by the coder’s personal 
perceptions and beliefs, the researcher has constructed operational definitions to each coding 
category in order to ensure the objectivity of the study and to eliminate any coders’ bias.  
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There have been standard variables in the beginning of the coding categories such as: the name of 
the newspaper, the date, the story position (whether it is in the front page, inside page, or last 
page), and the ruling regime by that time (whether it is President Mubarak or Sisi). Other categories 
have been coded as follows: 
Journalistic style: this category answers the question of which journalistic style is dominant in the 
news story. Two journalistic styles have been derived from Falkheimer and Olsson’s (2014) study 
of news framing of terrorist attacks in Norway. First, the descriptive style, where the coverage is 
dominated by descriptions of what happened, or even reporting what someone has said about the 
attack, all in a straight forward way, focusing on providing answers for what, when, who and 
where. Second, the interpretative style, where the news story is dominated by providing an 
explanation for why an attack has occurred, by providing evaluations and analysis. The journalist, 
here, focuses on answering the “why” question instead of focusing on the classical journalistic 
questions of what, where, who, and when.  
The key issue: this category answers the question of which problem, or which main angle does the 
story focus on. In case there is more than one key issue in a single news story, the coders choose 
the most highlighted one to be the key issue. The researcher has drawn on Li’s (2003) 
categorization of key issues and has added some key issues that might be relevant to the attacks, 
constructing 9 main categories:  
1. The attack itself: if the main issue in the story is to provide details about the attack and  
how , when, where, and why it has happened 
2. Victims of the attack: if the main focus of the news story is providing details about the 
number of victims, whether dead or injured, how severe are the injuries are or even details 
about their lives or their stories.   
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3. The government’s reaction to the attack: if the story focuses on the government’s efforts 
(including the military) to rescue the victims, adopting safety and security methods and 
procedures, initiating investigations, announcing official statements or issuing notes of 
condolences, or adopting new laws or policies.  
4. The Egyptian public’s reaction towards the attack: if the main issue of the story is to 
describe how the Egyptian community, whether Muslims or Christians, reacted to the 
attacks, providing information of whether there have been any protests or movements 
proceeding the attack.  
5. The international community’s reaction towards the attack: if the main focus of the story 
is to explain how other countries, foreign governments or foreign citizens reacted to the 
attack. 
6. The religious leaders’ reaction towards the attack: if the story focuses on how the church, 
Al Azhar, or even priests and religious leaders have reacted to the attack. 
7. Terrorism: if the story attempts to associate the attack with other terrorist attacks or with 
terrorist groups; or if the story refers to the attack as an attempt to intimidate the citizens 
or induce fear among the public in order to achieve a political goal (Ismail and Mishra 
2009). 
8. The Muslim-Coptic relations in Egypt: if the story mainly focuses on describing how the 
relationship between Muslims and Copts have been going, whether improving or 
deteriorating. 
9. Other key issue: if the main issue of the story does not fall under the previous categories 
 
Coverage frame: This category answers the question of which coverage frame dominated the news 
story. For the purpose of this study, the researcher has used the definitions stated by Semetko and 
50 
 
Valkenburg (2000), in addition to Falkheimer and Olsson’s definition of “war on terror” frame 
(2015). To measure the extent of whether each frame appears in the news story, the researcher has 
used a scale consisting of at least 3 questions for each frame; previously developed by Semetko 
and Valkenburg (2000), whereby coders use yes/no to answer the questions. Afterwards, the mean 
score for the questions will be calculated to examine the extent of whether each frame is present 
in the news stories. 
1. Conflict frame: such frame reflects the disagreement or conflicts between groups, 
organizations, or individuals. The scale used to measure the existence of this frame includes 
the following questions: (1) Does the story reflect disagreement between parties-
individuals-groups-countries? (2) Does one party-individual-group-country reproach one 
another? (3)Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the attacks? 
2. Human interest frame: such frame focuses on reflecting the emotional side, and bringing 
the human face of the issue, therefore, stimulating the psychological pulse of the audience. 
The scale used to measure the existence of this frame includes the following questions: (1) 
Does the story provide a human example, or human face on the attacks? (2) Does the story 
use adjectives or personal stories that generate feelings of sympathy, outrage, caring or 
compassion? (3) Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the 
attacks? (4) Does the story go into the private, personal lives of the actors? (5) Does the 
story include visual information that might generate feelings of sympathy, outrage, caring 
or compassion? 
3. Attribution of responsibility frame: the frame by which the news story holds the 
government, an individual, or a group responsible for the occurrence of the attacks, or for 
providing solutions. The scale used to measure the existence of this frame includes the 
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following questions: (1) Does the story suggest that some level of the government has the 
ability to alleviate the attacks? (2) Does the story suggest that some level of the government 
is responsible for the attacks? (3) Does the story suggest that an individual, or a group of 
people is responsible for the attacks? (4) Does the story suggest solutions to the attacks? 
4. Morality frame: such frame covers the attack in term of morals or religious context. It, also, 
involves prescriptions of right or wrong, fairness or unfairness, guilt or innocence. The 
scale used to measure the existence of this frame includes the following questions: (1) Does 
the story contain any moral message? (2) Does the story make reference to morality, God, 
and other religious tenets? (3) Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how 
to behave?  
5. Economic consequences frame: when the attack is covered in terms of the economic 
consequences it will hold on groups, individuals, organizations or countries. Such 
consequences include financial losses or gains, costs and expenses. The scale used to 
measure the existence of this frame includes the following questions: (1) Is there a mention 
of financial losses or gains now or in the future? (2) Is there a mention of the costs/degree 
of expense involved? (3) Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not 
pursuing a course of action? 
6. War on terror frame: according to Falkheimer and Olsson (2015), such frame has emerged 
in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack in USA. This frame has the tendency to 
link local conflicts to global ones (ex: ISIS, Al Qaeda…etc).  It is applied by the media to 
“justify and explain political and military strategies, especially when dealing with state 
opponents” (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). The scale used to measure the existence of this 
frame includes the following questions: (1) Does the story link the attack to terrorists with 
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global reach (ISIS, Al Qaeda..etc)?  (2) Does the story emphasize the fight against 
terrorism? (3) Does the story call for special powers for wartime, or demand patriotic 
allegiance?  
 
Frame context: this category answers the question of what was the context of the coverage frame. 
The coders here choose between the following categories based on Iyegnar’s (1991) classification 
of frame contexts: 
1. Thematic frame: if the news story presents the attack in a broader context, compare the 
attack to other attacks, or refer to the attack as result of general tendencies or trends in the 
society. Journalists also use the thematic frame when they try to explain the political, 
cultural, social and economic consequences of the attack.  
2. Episodic frame: if the news story is presented in a narrower context, focusing on a single 
attack, victims or actions without going beyond that. In other words, if the journalists refer 
to the attack as an individual issue with an individual solution rather than a societal issue 
demanding societal reaction. 
Sources: the coders have coded all the sources that the journalists referred to or quoted in the news 
stories. The researcher referred to Zeng and Tahat’s (2012) categorization of sources: 
1. National official source: any source that is appointed to an Egyptian governmental 
position. For example: the president, government’s spokesperson, ministers, governors, 
legislators…etc.  
2. International official source: foreign governmental sources. For example: foreign 
presidents, ambassadors, foreign ministers...etc.  
3. Witnesses: individuals who have had direct contact with the attack, or have experienced it 
personally including the victims who survived, their relatives, and also eye witnesses.  
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4. Experts: individuals who are intensively knowledgeable about terrorism issues, economic 
issues, and so forth. For example: terrorism scholars, security or military personnel, 
Doctors, Professors, economists…etc. 
5. Religious leaders: representatives of mosques and/or churches or any other religious 
groups. 
6. Terrorism perpetrators: groups or individuals who commit terrorist attacks. For example: 
members of ISIS, Al Qaeda…etc. 
7. People who are related to the perpetrator: for example his family, his neighbors, and so 
forth. 
8. Others: if the journalist has used a source that does not fit under the previous categories. 
9. Not mentioned: if the source in the news story was not mentioned. 
Blame placement: the researcher has developed the following categories to examine the attribution 
of blame in the content of news stories: 
1. The government: if the content include criticism of the government, its policy and/or its 
security procedures, or if the content accuse the government for the attack, or for their 
reaction to the attack. 
2. Islamic groups: if the content condemns or blames Islamic groups in general, or a single 
member of an Islamic group (such as the Muslim Brothers or Salafis or ISIS or Al Qaeda) 
for the attack.  
3. Terrorists: if the content incriminates specific or unknown terrorist who is not related to 
an Islamic group. 
4. Suicide bomber: if the news story condemns someone who carried out a suicide attack  
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5. Foreign agents: if the content incriminates a foreign agent and holds it responsible for the 
attack. 
6. No blame placement: if the story does not specify to whom the attack has been attributed 
7. Others: if the story condemns other individuals, or organizations for the attack. 
 
4.7 Inter-coder reliability 
According to Wimmer and Dominick (2014), it is essential to analyze a subsample of the 
data analyzed in order to assume the inter-coder reliability coefficient. The subsample, as 
mentioned by Wimmer and Dominick (2014) is between 10-25% of the whole study sample. The 
following formula has been provided by Holsti (1969) to determine the percentage of agreement 
between coders: “Reliability=2M/N1 + N2” (as cited in Wimmer, and Dominick, 2014, p. 175). 
Since three coders have worked on the coding for this study, the three coders have coded 10% of 
the whole sample and the results for each two coders have then been compared independently 
using Holsti (1969) formula. Finally, the results for all coders have been summed and divided by 
the number of coders. The results have shown an overall percentage of 97%, which is a high 






                                 Chapter 5: THE RESULTS 
 
5.1 Descriptive Overview 
A total of 553 news stories have been coded to test the research questions and hypothesis. 
The researcher has computed the results using SPSS program, which is a statistical software 
program that allows the researcher to describe the data and examine the relationship between 
variables using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics.  
Out of the total number of stories analyzed, 269 news stories (51%) have been coded 
from Al Ahram, and 284 (49%) have been coded from Al Masry Elyoum. There have been 78 
(14.1%) news stories that appeared on the front page, 467 stories (84.4%) that appeared on an 
inside page, and 8 (1.4%) that appeared on the last page in both newspapers. Under Mubarak’s 
rule, 316 (57.1%) news stories have been dedicated to only one attack, while on the other hand, a 
total of 237 (42.9%) stories have been dedicated to three attacks in different periods under Sisi’s 
regime. The major journalistic style in the news coverage has been the descriptive style, 
dominating 540 (97.6%) of the news stories; while only 13 (2.4%) stories of the total sample 
have used the interpretative style.  
The majority of the stories coded have mainly been concerned by the government’s 
reaction towards the attacks, which constituted 156 stories (28.2%); followed by both the 
religious leaders’ reaction to the attacks, the international community’s reaction to the attacks, 
and the Egyptian public’s reaction to the attacks; which constituted 61 and 60 and 59 stories 
(11%) respectively. Furthermore, 58 (10%) of the news stories have focused on the victims of 
the attacks, and 51 stories (10%) have focused on the Muslim-Coptic relations. Moreover, the 
key issue of 37 stories (7%) has been terrorism, and finally 55 stories (10%) have been 
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concerned with other issues like information about the perpetrators, the celebrities’ reaction to 
the attacks, the media’s reaction to the attacks and even the rumors after the attacks. 
 
5.2 Data Analysis 
RQ1: What are the dominant frames incorporated by both newspapers in the press 
coverage of the attacks? 
To examine the extent of which each frame is present in the study, the researcher has observed 
the overall mean score for each frame. The results are demonstrated in table 1. 
 












Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 
 
 
The results of the study suggest that the morality frame has been the most prominent in 
the news coverage of anti-Coptic attacks, with M=0.322 (s.d=0.397), followed by the war on 
terror frame M= 0.212 (s.d=0.367). The attribution of responsibility frame and the human 
interest frame have been respectively the third and fourth most prominent frames with M=0.170 
(s.d=0.206) and M=0.153 (s.d=0.296). Meanwhile, the conflict frame and the economic 





RQ2: What is the major frame context in the press coverage of the attacks? 
In order to answer this research question, the researcher has looked into the overall frame context 
in the press coverage of the attacks, the frame context in each newspaper, and the frame context 
of each one of the attacks.  
  
Figure 1 frame context overview 
 
 
 Overall frame context: As shown in figure 1, the researcher has noted that 53% of the total 
number of stories have used thematic frames, while 47% used Episodic frames. 
 
The frame context in each newspaper: in order to examine whether the frame context differs in 
each newspaper, the researcher has conducted a cross tabulation between the frame context and 










As shown in figure 2, the results suggest that the frame context differs in the governmental 
newspaper (Al Ahram) from the independent newspaper (Al Masry Elyoum). The major frame 
context in Al Ahram has been the thematic frame, with 30.56% of the total, while the major frame 
context in Al Masry Elyoum has been the episodic frame with 28.75% of the total. 
 
Table 2.  Chi square test results 
 








1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 18.885 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 19.762 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
19.597 1 .000   














Frame context * Newspaper
Al Ahram El Masry Elyoum
Figure 2 Frame context * Newspaper cross tabulation bar chart 
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To test the statistical significance of the above findings, the researcher has conducted a chi-
square test (shown in table 2). The results of the test, as shown in table 2, suggest that the results 
are statistically significant X
2
(1, N=553) = 19.63 and P <0.001 
 
The frame context in each of the attacks:  
Figure 3 frame context and the name of the attack cross tabulation 
 
  
The results of the cross tabulation, as shown in figure3, suggest that the major frame 
context in stories about “The Two Saints” attack in Alexandria 2011 was the episodic frame with 
31.10%. Meanwhile, the major frame context in stories about “The Coptic Cathedral” attack in 
Cairo 2016 was the thematic frame with 11.75%. The results have also shown that the major 
frame context in stories about both “The Saint George” attack in Tanta 2017 and “The Saint 



















Frame context * the name of the attack
"The two saints" attack in Alexandria 2011
"The Coptic Cathedral" attack in Cairo 2016
"The Saint George" Attack in Tanta 2017
"The Saint Mark" attack in Alexandria 2017
Both "Saint George" and "Saint Mark" attacks in 2017
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Table 3 Chi square test results 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 78.148a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 85.355 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.553 1 .010 
N of Valid Cases 553   
 
The researcher has also conducted a chi-square test to examine the statistical significance 
of the above results. The chi-square test suggests that the results are statistically significant X
2
 
(4, N=553)= 78.148, and P <0.001 
H1: The type of frame will differ according to the type of newspaper? 
 
To test the hypothesis, the researcher has compared the means for each frame in each newspaper 
and then conducted a t-test to examine the statistical significance for each frame in each 
newspaper. 
Table 4 Comparing frame means for each newspaper 















Al Ahram           Mean 
                            N 
              Std. deviation 
 .0322 
   269 
 .16224 
  .1517 
    269 
 





  .3705 
    269 
 
   .41959 
   .0285 
     269 
 
  .13357 
  .2590 
    269 
 
  .37579 
Al Masry            Mean    
Elyoum                ` N 
                Std. deviation 
                               
 .0986 
   284 
 
 .24681 
  .1556 
    284 
 
  .29000 




   .2770 
     284 
 
    .2770 
   .0188 
     284 
 
.09101 
  .1690 





         
 
The differences between means, as shown in table 4, suggest that the most prominent 
frame in both Al Ahram and Al Masry El youm has been the morality frame with M= 0.3705 and 
M= 0.2770 (s.d= 0.41959 and s.d= 0.2770). The second most prominent frame in Al Ahram has 
been the war on terror frame with M= .2590 (s.d= 0.37579), while the second most prominent 
frame in Al Masry Elyoum has been the attribution of responsibility frame with M= .2051 (s.d= 
0.22234). The third most prominent frame in Al Ahram the human interest frame with M= 
0.1517 (s.d= .30452), followed by the attribution of responsibility frame with M= 0.1348 (s.d= 
0.18123) Meanwhile, the third most prominent frame in Al Masry Elyoum has been the war on 
terror frame with M= 0.1690 (s.d= 0.35389), followed by the human interest frame with M= 
0.1556 (s.d= 0.29000). Finally, the least prominent frame in both newspapers has been the 
conflict frame with M= 0.0322 and M= 0.0986 (s.d= 0.16224 and 0.24681), followed by the 






Total                    Mean 
                            N 
                Std. deviation 
 
 .0663 
   553 
 
 .21240 
    .1537 
      553 
 
   .29689 




   .3225 
     553 
 
 .39761 
   .0235 
     553 
 
.11372 
  .2128 
    553 
 




Table 5 T-test of significance 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
 
   
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Conflict frame  
    Equal variances assumed 
    Equal variances not assumed 









Human interest frame 
   Equal variances assumed 
    Equal variances not assumed 









Attribution of responsibility 
    Equal variances assumed 
    Equal variances not assumed  
6.435790 .011  
     







        .000 
Morality frame 
    Equal variances assumed 
    Equal variances not assumed 




     551 




    Equal variances assumed 
    Equal variances not assumed 








War on terror  
    Equal variances assumed 
    Equal variances not assumed 











As for the T-test of statistical significance, the results shown in table 5 suggest that 4 out 
of the 6 frames encounter statistical significance: the conflict frame t (494) = -3.733199 and P 
<0.001, the attribution of responsibility frame t (540) = -4.016 and P <0.001, the morality frame t 
(532) = 2.840927 P= 0.005, and the war on terror frame t (542) = 2.944 and P= 0.003. 
Meanwhile, two frames have not encountered statistical significance in both newspapers: the 
human interest frame t (551) = -0.399073 and P= 0.690, and the economic consequence frame t 
(466) =1.010 and P=0.313 
 
H2: Official sources will be quoted more than other sources in both newspapers  





The researcher has coded all attributed sources in each story using a multiple response 















People who are 









in 35% of the total sample. The next has been the religious leaders, who are attributed in 19% of 
the sample. The witnesses, experts and other sources like normal citizens, celebrities, university 
professors, and so forth have been equally attributed in 10% of the sample. The international 
official sources and the anonymous and unmentioned sources have also been equally attributed 
in 7% of the total sample. The least attributed sources have been the terrorism perpetrators and 
their relatives, constituting only 1% of the sample.  
 
H3: The type of frame in the news story will differ according to the type of source in each 
newspaper 
In order to examine this hypothesis, the researcher has compared the means for frames in each 
source, and then has used a t-test to examine the statistical significance of the most prominent 
frame used by each source. 
Frames used by national official sources 
As demonstrated in table 6, the most common frame in stories that attribute national 
official sources is the war on terror frame with M= 0.2734 (S.d= 0.43220).  
 
Table 6. Test of frame differences for means used by national official sources 











War on terror 
frame 
no Mean .0626 .1951 .1385 .3682 .0164 .1703 
N 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Std. Deviation .20915 .34062 .19949 .41510 .10346 .30721 
yes Mean .0716 .0947 .2171 .2573 .0336 .2734 
N 228 228 228 228 228 228 
Std. Deviation .21730 .20686 .20728 .36228 .12648 .43220 
Total Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 






The results of the t-test for statistical significance suggest that this finding is statistically 
significant, with t (382) = -3.096046 and P= 0.002 
 
Frames used by international official sources 
 
As shown in table 7, the most common frame used in stories that attribute international official 
sources is the war on terror frame, with M= 0.4792 (S.d= 0.40625) 
 
 
The results of the t-test assume statistical significance for the use of war on terror frame 
in stories that attribute international official sources with t (53) = -4.805025 and P<0.001 
 



















no Mean .0713 .1675 .1832 .3248 .0238 .1875 
N 505 505 505 505 505 505 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21968 .30689 .20920 .40025 .11447 .35333 
yes Mean .0139 .0083 .0417 .2986 .0208 .4792 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Std. 
Deviation 
.09623 .04039 .10735 .37182 .10666 .40625 
Total Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Std. 
Deviation 





Frames used by Witnesses 
 
As shown in table 8 above, the most common frame used in stories that attribute 
witnesses is the human interest frame, with M= 0.7187 (S.d= 0.36116). The results of the t-test 
have further assumed statistical significance for the use of human interest frame in stories that 
attribute witnesses with t (67) = -13.908664 and P<0.001 
  
 
Frames used by experts  
As demonstrated in table 9 below, the most common frame used by experts is the 
morality frame with M= 0.0.3641 (S.d= 0.42379) 
 

















no Mean .0661 .0798 .1702 .3320 .0252 .2311 
N 489 489 489 489 489 489 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21539 .18844 .20125 .40206 .11901 .37813 
yes Mean .0677 .7187 .1758 .2500 .0104 .0729 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Std. 
Deviation 
.18949 .36116 .24267 .35635 .05846 .22591 
Total Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 




The results of the t-test, however, have shown that the mean difference for the morality 
frame in stories that attribute experts is not statistically significant, with t (551) = -0.898189 and 
P= 0.369 
Frames used by religious leaders 
As shown in table 10 below, the most common frame used in stories that attribute 
religious leaders is the morality frame with M= 0.6276 (S.d= 0.39379)  
 
Table 10 Test of mean differences for frames used by religious leaders 
















no Mean .0588 .1755 .1794 .2306 .0259 .2094 
N 425 425 425 425 425 425 
Std. 
Deviation 
.19943 .31855 .20751 .35043 .12375 .37452 














War on  
terror 
frame 
no Mean .0642 .1656 .1655 .3169 .0205 .2172 




.21033 .30888 .20617 .39412 .10482 .37634 
yes Mean .0821 .0646 .2115 .3641 .0462 .1795 




.22845 .15854 .20363 .42379 .16538 .28914 
Tot
al 
Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 




.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 
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N 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Std. 
Deviation 
.24999 .19350 .20011 .39379 .07073 .34268 
Total Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 
 
The results of the t-test have further indicated statistical significance for the use of morality 
frame by religious leaders with t (191) = -10.249485 and P<0.001 
Frames used by terrorism perpetrators 
As demonstrated in table 11 below, the most common frame in stories that attribute 
terrorism perpetrators is the attribution of responsibility frame with M= 0.3333 (S.d= 0.25820) 
 



















no Mean .0670 .1550 .1691 .3260 .0238 .2139 
N 547 547 547 547 547 547 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21345 .29814 .20517 .39834 .11432 .36863 
yes Mean .0000 .0333 .3333 .0000 .0000 .1111 
N 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Std. 
Deviation 
.00000 .08165 .25820 .00000 .00000 .17213 
Total Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 
 
The results of the t-test, however, have indicated that the use of attribution of 





Frames used by people who are related to terrorism perpetrators 
As shown in table 12 below, the most common frame used in stories that attribute people 
who are related to terrorism perpetrators is the human interest frame, with M= 0.3714 
(S.d=0.29468) 
 
Table 12 Test of mean differences for frames used by people who are related to the perpetrator 


















no Mean .0659 .1509 .1703 .3260 .0238 .2143 
N 546 546 546 546 546 546 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21209 .29468 .20670 .39871 .11442 .36831 
yes Mean .0952 .3714 .2143 .0476 .0000 .0952 
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Std. 
Deviation 
.25198 .40708 .17252 .12599 .00000 .25198 
Total Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 
 
The results of the t-test, however, assume that there is no statistical significance for the 
use of human interest frame in stories that attribute people who are related to the perpetrator, t 
(6)=  -1.428397 and  P=0.202 
Frames used in stories with unmentioned sources 
As shown in table 13 below, the most common frame used in stories with unmentioned or 
anonymous sources is the human interest frame with M= 0.1510 (S.d= 0.27848) 
 
Table 13 Test of mean differences for frames used by unmentioned sources 
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no Mean .0615 .1540 .1746 .3433 .0238 .2235 
N 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Std. 
Deviation 
.20261 .29888 .20918 .40227 .11065 .37521 
yes Mean .1156 .1510 .1327 .1088 .0204 .1020 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Std. 
Deviation 
.29306 .27848 .17003 .26691 .14286 .24724 
Tot
al 
Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 
 
The results of the t-test, however, assume that the difference between means is 
statistically insignificant with t (551) = 0.066293 and P= 0.947 
Frames used by other sources 
As shown in table 14, the most common frame used in stories that attribute other sources 
like ordinary citizens, celebrities, university professors, and so forth is the morality frame with 
M= 0.3529 (S.d= 0.41880) 
 
Table 14 Test of mean differences for frames used by other sources 















no Mean .0625 .1522 .1711 .3182 .0254 .2254 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
Std. 
Deviation 
.20660 .30209 .20603 .39481 .11947 .37975 
yes Mean .0931 .1647 .1691 .3529 .0098 .1225 
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Std. 
Deviation 
.25001 .25845 .20913 .41880 .05674 .24369 
Total Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 





.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 
 
The results of the t-test, however, assume that the difference between means is 
statistically insignificant, with t (551) = -0.674 and P= 0.500 
 
. H4: The frames incorporated by both newspapers differ according to different 
governments 
To examine whether the frames differed according to different ruling regimes, the researcher has 
observed the differences between mean scores according to different governments. The values 
for each frame are elaborated in table 15. The results are then examined for their statistical 
significance using a t-est.  
 
 
Table 15 Comparing frame means for each government 



















Mean .0939 .1259 .1574 .3608 .0222 .1635 
N 316 316 316 316 316 316 
Std. 
Deviation 
.24627 .27318 .19905 .42491 .10887 .35584 
Sisi Mean .0295 .1907 .1888 .2714 .0253 .2785 
N 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Std. 
Deviation 
.14898 .32272 .21454 .35244 .12009 .37241 
Total Mean .0663 .1537 .1709 .3225 .0235 .2128 
N 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Std. 
Deviation 
.21240 .29689 .20623 .39761 .11372 .36715 
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The differences between means in the different ruling regimes, as shown in table 15, 
suggest that the most prominent frame in Mubarak’s regime was the morality fame, with M= 
0.3608 (S.d= 0.10887). Meanwhile the most prominent frame in Sisi’s regime was the war on 
terror frame with M= 0.2785 (S.d= 0.37241). The second most prominent frame in Mubarak’s 
regime was the war on terror frame with M= 0.1635 (S.d= 0.35584), followed by the attribution 
of responsibility frame with M= 0.1574 (S.d= 0.19905). On the other hand, the second most 
prominent frame in Sisi’s regime has been the morality frame with M= 0.2714 (S.d= 0.35244), 
followed by the human interest frame with M= 0.1907 (S.d= 0.32272). The fourth most 
prominent frame in Mubarak’s regime has been the human interest frame with M= 0.1259 (S.d= 
0.27318), while the fourth most prominent frame in Sisi’s regime was the attribution of 
responsibility frame with M= 0.1888 (S.d= 0.21454). The least prominent frames in both 
Mubarak and Sisi’s regime were the conflict frame with M= 0.0939 and M= 0.0295 (S.d= 
0.24627, and 0.14898) and the economic consequence frame with M= 0.0222 and M= 0.0253 
(s.d= 0.10887, and 0.12009). 
Table 16. T-test results for statistical significance 
 
 Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Conflict frame Equal variances 
assumed 
53.712 .000 3.563 551 .000 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  3.808 529.22
0 
.000 
Human interest frame Equal variances 
assumed 
12.125 .001 -2.551 551 .011 
Equal variances 
not assumed 




 The results of the t-test for statistical significance, as shown in table 16, suggest that there 
has been a statistical significance for only 4 of the 6 frames: the conflict frame with t (529) = 
3.808 P<0.001, the human interest frame with t (458) = -2.492 and P=0.013, the morality frame 
t(545)= 2.698 and P=0.007 and the war on terror frame t(495)= -3.662 and P<0.001. Meanwhile, 
the results for the attribution of responsibility frame and economic consequence frame have not 
been statistically significant with t (551)= -1.774 P=0.077 and t(551)= -0.324 P=0.746 
 
H5: The attribution of blame will differ according to different governments 
To answer this question, the researcher has conducted a cross tabulation and a chi square test 
between the independent variable (the ruling regime) and the dependent variable (the attribution 
of blame). The results of the chi square test assume statistical significance in the relationship 
between the ruling regime and the blame placement X
2








2.560 .110 -1.774 551 .077 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -1.755 487.00 .080 
Morality frame Equal variances 
assumed 
28.966 .000 2.628 551 .009 
Equal variances 
not assumed 





.415 .520 -.324 551 .746 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -.319 479.98 .750 
War on terror frame Equal variances 
assumed 
18.819 .000 -3.686 551 .000 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -3.662 495.71 .000 
74 
 
Table 17 Blame placement * The ruling regime Cross tabulation 




the government Count 14 7 21 
Expected Count 12.0 9.0 21.0 
% within The ruling 
regime 
4.4% 3.0% 3.8% 
Islamic groups Count 19 25 44 
Expected Count 25.1 18.9 44.0 





terrorists Count 11 73 84 
Expected Count 48.0 36.0 84.0 





suicide bomber Count 17 33 50 
Expected Count 28.6 21.4 50.0 





foreign agents Count 59 0 59 
Expected Count 33.7 25.3 59.0 
% within The ruling 
regime 
18.7% 0.0% 10.7% 
No blame 
placement 
Count 181 96 277 
Expected Count 158.3 118.7 277.0 





Others Count 15 3 18 
Expected Count 10.3 7.7 18.0 
% within The ruling 
regime 
4.7% 1.3% 3.3% 
Total Count 316 237 553 
Expected Count 316.0 237.0 553.0 










The results of the cross tabulation, as illustrated in table 17 above, suggest that the blame 
placement under Mubarak’s regime was distributed as follows: No blame placement = 57% 
(N=181), foreign agents =18.7% (N=59), Islamic groups= 6% (N=19), suicide bomber= 5.4% 
(N= 17), others= 4.7% (N=15), the government =4.4% (N=14), terrorists=3.5% (N=11). 
Meanwhile, the blame placement under Sisi’s regime is distributed as follows:  No blame 
placement= 40.5% (N= 96), terrorists =30.8% (N=73), suicide bomber=13.9% (N=33), Islamic 












 CHAPTER 6:  
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION,  
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
      This chapter includes the research discussion, its conclusions, its limitations, and 
recommendations for future research. 
6. 1. Discussion 
This study has been conducted to examine how Egyptian newspapers framed anti-Coptic 
attacks in Egypt from 2011 till 2017, under two different ruling regimes, Mubarak and Sisi. The 
study has employed a frame analysis of 6 frames, previously defined by Semetko and Valkenburg 
(2000), and Falkheimer and Olsson (2015): the conflict frame, the human interest frame, the 
attribution of responsibility frame, the morality frame, the economic consequences frame and the 
war on terror frame. The sample for this study included one governmental newspaper (Al Ahram), 
and one independent newspaper (Al Masry Elyoum). A content analysis has been conducted to 
examine the coverage of 4 different attacks during one week after each attack: the “Two Saints” 
Church bombing in Alexandria in January 2011, the “Coptic Cathedral” Church bombing in Cairo 
in December 2016, the “Saint George” Church bombing in Tanta in April 2017, and finally the 
“Saint Mark” Church bombing in Alexandria in April 2017 
As part of the sampling process, the study has included an equal number of issues for each 
newspaper. However, the coded content has been any article that referred to any of the attacks 
previously mentioned. Interestingly, the number of stories in Al Ahram (N=268) was very close 
to the number of stories in Al Masry El youm (N=285), giving a very close ratio of 49% to 51%. 
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These findings have been different from Elsasser’s (2010), who examined the governmental and 
independent newspapers’ coverage of Abu Fana incident, and has found that the governmental 
newspapers barely awarded the attack any attention, while the independent newspapers gave it the 
major attention. The research results, thus, suggest a shift in the agenda of governmental 
newspapers, from concealing Coptic issues to exposing them. 
The study has also looked into the journalistic style used in the news coverage of anti-Coptic 
attacks. Previous research suggest an increased tendency for journalists to use the interpretative 
style (Gulati et al., 2004; Neveu, 2002), whereby journalists shift from being observers to being 
analysts and focus more on explaining why a certain event has occurred. However, the results of 
the study have shown that the majority of the news coverage in both newspapers was descriptive 
(98%, N=540). This has been similar to what Falkheimer and Olsson (2011) discovered in their 
study of framing terrorist attacks in Norway, whereby they found that the press coverage of the 
terrorist attacks in Norway has been dominated by the descriptive style. The reason why the 
interpretative journalistic style is not so common in Egyptian journalism might pertain to the very 
limited freedom of speech granted to Egyptian journalists.  
The research has shown that both newspapers dedicated the highest percentage of coverage to 
the government’s reaction to the attack (28.2%) N=156. During both ruling regimes, most of the 
stories in both newspapers highlighted the government’s efforts to secure the churches, initiate 
investigations, and to look after the victims. It is also worth noting that the governmental 
newspaper (Al Ahram) used adjectives that directly praised the president and the government in 
some of the stories, which calls their journalistic practice into question. The attempts to praise the 
regime have sometimes even come at the expense of the accountability and credibility of “Al 
Ahram”, when on January 4th 2011, a news story in the front page mentioned in the headline “the 
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young sherry lost her mum and dad forever”, and then on the following day another story 
mentioned that the governor decided to arrange a special exam committee for that girl in the 
hospital, and in the same story they mentioned that the governor’s decision “got sherry’s mother, 
who was with her in the hospital, very delighted”. The research has also noted that only the 
independent newspaper conducted direct interviews with people related to the perpetrators, and 
provided personal stories citing their families and neighbors. However, they were also clearly 
biased towards the regime, similar the findings of Elsasser (2010).  
News stories that were mainly concerned with the Muslim Coptic relations have been 
dedicated a small percentage of the news coverage (10%) N=51. However, almost all of the stories 
included either direct or indirect references to the relationship between Muslims and Copts. In 
these stories, the press highlighted the strong basis of Muslim-Coptic relations and emphasized the 
concept of national unity. They have portrayed the Muslims and Copts as “brothers” who share 
the same land, live together and grieve together. They have, also, stressed on the idea that the 
attacks have offended both Muslims and Christians and that the attacks were not secular, but rather 
terrorist attacks. This supports what Iskander (2012) has previously explained, that “In most cases, 
when an incident cannot be denied – for example, in the reporting during its immediate aftermath 
– the emphasis of the discourse is on mitigating tensions by underlining the non-sectarian elements 
of the dispute and reiterating statements of national unity”. Such finding, however, has been unlike 
Elsasser’s (2010), who has found that the media focused more on highlighting the intensified 
tension between Muslims and Christians. He has, further, noted that when the media focus on the 
mutual distrust between Muslims and Christians and try to alleviate the issue using “religious 
terms”, which actually leads to an aggravation of an already existing sectarian tension. His notion 
might explain why the media has refrained from referring to the incidents as sectarian issues, and 
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has focused more on portraying the good side of the Muslim Coptic relations.  The research has 
also noted that the era of Mubarak’s ruling regime was the one that included many stories 
highlighting the Muslim Coptic relationships.  
The study has examined the dominant frames that appeared in Al Ahram and Al Masry 
Elyoum in their press coverage of the attacks, by comparing the mean scores of each frame in both 
newspapers. The results of the study suggest that overall, the most dominant frame in the press 
coverage of the anti-Coptic attacks is the morality frame (M= 0.322, s.d=0.397).  In these news 
articles, there has been a strong attempt to highlight that these attacks do not stem from an Islamic 
ideology and that Islam is a religion of peace. They also stressed on the notion of national unity, 
ensuring that the attacks have offended both Muslims and Christians and that there were also 
Muslim citizens among the victims. The most common phrase noted among these articles has been 
“terrorism has no religion”, which was stated more than once. Apparently, most of the news articles 
used this approach since the Egyptian population is conservative in nature, and they often adhere 
to the religious discourse; thus, the media tried to speak to them in a manner which they would 
conform to. For example, various articles included phrases from the Quran and the Bible that 
prohibit inciting violence and emphasize religious tolerance. 
The findings of the study also suggest that the least dominant frame in the press coverage has 
been the economic consequence frame, which is not surprising as the main focus has been to lessen 
the mutual distrust between Muslims and Christians, disregarding the economic scene in Egypt. In 
this approach, there have been very few articles that included statistics and data about the negative 
implications of the attacks on the economy. However, surprisingly, there has been one news article 
that claimed that the attacks did not have a negative impact on tourism, even though there have 
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been other articles stating that countries such as the UK called off their flight to Egypt until further 
notice.  
The previous literature on media and terrorism suggest that the news media use both thematic 
and episodic frames in covering terrorism issues (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). For example, 
while examining the framing of the September 11 attacks in American networks, it has been found 
that the coverage was dominated by episodic frames, disregarding the social and political 
conditions (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). Meanwhile, there have been other scholars who 
suggested that the media focus more on “global macro frames” when they report news about 
conflicts and wars (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). Similarly, the results of this study suggest that 
overall, the major frame context in the press coverage of the attacks has been the thematic frame, 
dominating 53% of the coverage. However, the episodic frame has been present in 47% of the 
news stories, meaning that the percentage is somehow close and that the journalists used both 
thematic and episodic frames in portraying the attacks.  
The results of the study have further indicated that the frame context differed in the 
governmental newspaper from the independent newspaper. In Al Ahram, the major frame context 
has been the thematic frame, while the major frame context in Al Masry Elyoum has been the 
episodic frame. These results have even encountered statistical significance. According to Iyengar 
(1991), it is not only the attribution of responsibility frame that determines who the audience will 
assign the blame to. The frame context, as well, directs the audience to who is responsible for the 
problem. Therefore, the findings of the study were surprising, since the use of thematic frames by 
the governmental newspaper (which is supposed to be the mouthpiece of the government) lies the 
responsibility in the hands of entities, whether foreign, Islamic, or even the government itself. 
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Meanwhile, the coverage in the independent newspaper which was mainly episodic, has shielded 
the government from responsibility through providing “issue-specific” attribution of blame.  
The research has further looked into the use of each frame in each newspaper, and examined 
whether the frames differed based on the type of newspaper. The results of the study suggest that 
the most prominent frame in Al Ahram and Al Masry Elyoum is the same, which is the morality 
frame (M= 0.3705, s.d=0.41959 and M= 0.2770, s.d= 0.2770). Both newspapers referred to phrases 
from the holy Quran to condemn the attacks. For example “Al Masry Elyoum” on 2nd Januray 
2011, published in the headline on the front page, the day that followed the attack was “as if he 
killed everyone”, which is a phrase from the holy Quran that condemns anyone who kills innocent 
souls.  Likewise, in “Al Ahram”, a story mentioned in the headline on 6th January 2011, “All 
Muslims must protect the churches, and this is an order clearly stated in Quran”. 
The human interest frame has been almost equally used by both newspapers, whereby the 
news articles have emphasized the huge impact of the attacks on the personal lives of the victims, 
in order to invoke sympathy by the readers. For instance, on the 12th of April 2017, a news story 
in Al Masry Elyoum mentioned in its headline “the wife of Medhat Moussa, one of the victims, 
said: “my husband returned with me as a piece of meat”. Similarly powerful quotes have also been 
used by Al Ahram. For instance, on the 3rd of January 2011, a news article had in its headline 
“Mina was ready to get married, before he was killed and his fiancé was severely injured by the 
hands of terrorists”. It is also worth noting that the human interest frame has sometimes been used 
by both newspapers with a twist of focus on victims of the police, who have been killed in their 
duties to protect the churches. This approach has been used to invoke sympathy with the police 
members in order to conceal the gaps in security.  
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The results have also indicated that both newspapers showed minimal use of the conflict frame 
and the economic consequences frame. The minimal use of the conflict frame in both newspapers 
was shocking, given the fact that after each attack, there were several protests that resulted in 
disputes between the citizens and the police. Some have even resulted in conflicts between 
Muslims and Christians. Surprisingly, Al Masry Elyoum mentioned in the headline of a story 
published on January 4th 2011, “The angry protests after the attack in Alexandria have set out a 
record, with 6 organized protests in Cairo”. The use of the phrase “set out a record” was in fact 
interesting, since the attack by that time has occurred right before the Egyptian revolution.  
The minimal use of the economic consequence frame has been also alarming.  Even so when 
“Al Ahram” has used the economic consequence frame, the news stories elaborated that the 
Egyptian economy overcame the negative implications of the attack on the economy, when on the 
3rd of January 2011, Al Ahram mentioned in the headline “the stock market overcomes the attack 
in Alexandria, with an increase in the price of 138 shares and an increase in foreign investments”. 
On the other hand, when Al Masry Elyoum used the economic consequence frame, they have 
actually referred to the negative economic implications of the attacks. For instance, a news article 
on April 10th 2017 mentioned in the headline “the stock market loses 7 billion pounds after the 
attacks on churches”.  
Other frames have fared differently across newspapers. For example, “Al Masry Elyoum” has 
used the attribution of responsibility frame more than “Al Ahram”. Nevertheless, the responsibility 
has not been pointed towards the government except for once on 6th January 2011, when a news 
story mentioned that the American secretary of international affairs said that the government did 
not take any measures to stop repression and discrimination against Christians in Egypt, and failed 
to punish those who have been responsible for violence and religious intolerance.        
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Moreover, the war on terror frame has been used more by “Al Ahram”, whereby the attacks 
have been mostly linked to terrorists with global reach like “Al Qaeda” or “ISIS”, and the demand 
for patriotic allegiances to fight terrorism has been emphasized. It is also worth mentioning that 
the war on terror frame has been sometimes used to instill fear in the minds of the readers that such 
attacks are an attempt by terrorists to make Egypt like Iraq (when Mubarak was in power), or Syria 
(When Sisi was in power). This analogy is actually interesting, since the deterioration in Iraq and 
Syria would definitely invoke fear in the minds of the readers, thinking if they oppose the regime, 
the situation in Egypt will get worse.   
Although there have been differences in the mean score for some frames in each newspaper, 
only 4 out of the 6 frames have shown statistical significance: the conflict frame, the attribution of 
responsibility frame, the morality frame, and the war on terror frame. The economic consequence 
frame and the human interest frame, however, have not encountered statistical significance. This 
might suggest that both newspapers have used these frames in the same manner.  
The research has, also, examined the diversity of sources in the press coverage of the attacks. 
The results have illustrated that the official sources, whether local or international ones, constituted 
54% of the coverage. Cozma and Kozman (2014) have previously explained that the journalists 
tend to rely more on official sources because they are more authoritative, so they are perceived as 
the most credible among the public. They have further explained that their reliance on official 
sources is sometimes due to the time and space constrains. The research findings have been similar 
to  Manoff and Schudson ‘s(1987) as well as Sigal’s (1973), who found out that more than three 
quarters of the news sources were official institutions and government officials. The findings have, 
also, been similar to Wittebols’ (1996), Palez et.al’s (1982), Atwater and Green’s (1988), and 
Kothari’s (2010), who found that official sources dominated coverage of terrorism news.  
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The study has also examined the effect of news sources on the frames used in the coverage of 
the attacks. The results suggest that the most common frame in stories that attribute official 
sources, whether national or international, was the war on terror frame (M= 0.2734, S.d= 0.43220), 
(M= 0.4792 S.d= 0.40625). The results have even assumed statistical significance, t (382) = -
3.096046, P= 0.002, and t (53) = -4.805025, P<0.001. These results differ from that of Peng Kee 
et. al’s (2012), which suggested that stories attributing official sources rely more on the attribution 
of responsibility frame. The research findings also suggest that the most common frame in stories 
that attribute witnesses is the human interest frame (M= 0.7187, S.d= 0.36116). The results have 
even encountered statistical significance with t (67) = -13.908664 and P<0.001. These results are 
similar to that of Peng Kee et. al’s (2012), who illustrated that stories attributing ordinary citizens 
relied more on human interest frame. 
The study has also found that the most common frame in stories that attribute experts is the 
morality frame (M= 0.0.3641, S.d= 0.42379). However, these results did not encounter statistical 
significance with t (551) = -0.898189 and P= 0.369. This might be because all of the stories that 
attributed experts included other sources as well, so the morality frame might have been relevant 
to the other sources in the story. The study has further found that the most common frame in stories 
that attribute religious leaders is the morality frame (M= 0.6276, S.d= 0.39379) and the results 
have further assumed statistical significance with t (191) = -10.249485 and P<0.001. Such finding 
has not been surprising, since religious leaders often tend to explain the problem in a religious 
context. Surprisingly, the results have shown that the most common frame used by terrorism 
perpetrators is the attribution of responsibility frame (M= 0.3333, S.d= 0.25820). These results, 
however, have been statistically insignificant with t (551) = -1.944930 and P= 0.052. Furthermore, 
the most common frame in stories that attribute people who are related to the perpetrator is the 
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human interest frame (M= 0.3714, S.d=0.29468). The results have been, however, statistically 
insignificant with t (6)=  -1.428397 and  P=0.202. The findings, also, suggest that the most 
common frame in stories with anonymous or unmentioned sources is the human interest frame 
(M= 0.1510, S.d= 0.27848). However, they have been statistically insignificant with t (551) = 
0.066293 and P= 0.947. Finally, the findings suggest that the most common frame in stories that 
attribute other sources like celebrities, ordinary citizens, university professors, and so forth, is the 
morality frame (M= 0.3529, S.d= 0.41880). However, these results have been statistically 
insignificant with t (551) = -0.674 and P= 0.500. The most logical explanation for frames that have 
not encountered statistical significance might be the fact that such stories included other sources 
as well that employed these frames.  
There has also been an attempt to discover whether frames differed according to different 
ruling regimes. During Mubarak’s era, the most common frame was morality frame with (M= 
0.3608, S.d= 0.10887). The second most common frame was the war on terror frame, followed by 
the attribution of responsibility frame, the human interest frame, the conflict frame and the 
economic consequences frame. Meanwhile, the most common frame in Sisi’s era has been the war 
on terror frame (M= 0.2785, S.d= 0.37241). The second most common frame during Sisi’s regime 
was the morality frame, followed by the human interest frame, the attribution of responsibility 
frame, the conflict frame and the economic consequences frame. On the other hand, only 4 of the 
6 frames have encountered statistical significance: the conflict frame, the human interest frame, 
the morality frame, and the war on terror frame. Meanwhile, the use of responsibility frame and 
the economic consequence frame has been statistically insignificant. This might suggest that the 
use of these frames have not differed based on different ruling regimes.  
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The reason why frames in Mubarak’s regime have differed from Sisi’s regime might be due 
to the fact that when Mubarak was in power, he was somehow unchallenged. The main focus of 
his administration has been to maintain power and the current status quo. The attacks against 
Copts, at that time, have been viewed as a threat to that status quo. They feared the Copts may 
respond aggressively, which might lead to a chain of events that would result in violence which 
would disrupt his power. That is why the media has always focused on the idea that Muslims and 
Copts share the same land and portrayed it in moral terms in order to calm the increasingly Coptic 
rage. Meanwhile, when Sisi has come into power, the main premise of his campaign has been 
empowering national unity to defeat terrorism. This explains that the ruling regime indirectly 
influences the media discourse to the favor of whoever is in power.  
The study has, also, aimed to examine whether the attribution of blame differed according to 
different ruling regimes. The results suggest that the highest percentage (57%-40%) of news stories 
during both Mubarak and Sisi’s regime has not included any blame placement. However, the 
second most common blame placement during Mubarak’s regime was on foreign agents (19%). 
This might be due to the fact that Mubarak did not want to rile up the Christian population by 
blaming the attacks on Muslim extremists. Moreover, he did not want to lose the large Muslim 
population by blaming Islamic groups, so it was always easier to blame foreign agents who were 
often perceived by the Egyptians as enemies. Meanwhile, During Sisi’s rule, the second most 
common blame placement has been on terrorists (31%), which further supports his premise of 
defeating terrorism. It is, also, worth noting that during both ruling regimes a very few percentage 
blamed the government for the attacks (3% and 4%), which has not been surprising, given the fact 
that all of the news stories seemed to praise the government and their efforts to secure Egyptian 
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Copts. Finally, the results have assumed statistical significance in the relationship between the 
blame placement and the ruling regime: X
2






This study is set out to examine how governmental and independent newspapers framed the 
anti-Coptic attacks in Egypt in the period between 2011 and 2017. A quantitative content 
analysis of 553 news articles, published in “Al Ahram” and “Al Masry Elyoum”, has been 
conducted in order to categorize the frames used in the news coverage of the attacks. More 
specifically, the study has looked to provide answers to the following notions: what are the 
dominant frames in the news coverage of anti-Coptic attacks?, how did the frames differ 
according to the type of newspaper (whether governmental or independent) and the ruling 
regime?, what is the frame context used by both newspaper?, what are the dominant sources used 
in the news coverage of anti-Coptic attacks?, how did the sources affect the type of frame?, and 
finally whether the attribution of blame will differ according to different ruling governments.  
The study has concluded that both the governmental and the independent newspapers have 
relied mostly on the morality frame in an attempt to heal the unrest between Muslims and 
Christians, by ensuring that Muslims cannot be condemned for the attacks and that terrorism has 
no religion. It is also worth noting that both newspapers have totally neglected the negative 
implications that the attacks held on the economy, since the economic consequences frame has 
been barely used.  
The research has also shown that the overall frame context in the press coverage of the anti-
Coptic attacks has been the thematic frame. However, the ratio between the use of thematic frame 
and the use of episodic frame has not been very high, meaning that they used both thematic and 
episodic frames to an equal extent. The study has further indicated a difference in the frame context 
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between the governmental newspaper and the independent one, whereby the governmental 
newspaper relied more on thematic frames, while the independent one relied more on episodic 
frames.  
The study has also found that the use of some frames have differed across both newspapers, 
while other frames have almost been used equally. For example, the use of morality frame has not 
differed according to the type of newspaper. It has been the most dominant frame in both “Al 
Ahram” and “Al Masry Elyoum”. Similarly, the use of the conflict frame and the economic 
consequences frame have not differed across both newspapers, since they have been the least used 
frames. Both the governmental and the independent newspapers have not given much attention to 
the conflicts caused by the mass protests that followed each attack, or the negative economic 
implications of the attacks. This reflects that although the journalists carry on their shoulders the 
responsibility to inform the audience with all the possible sides and consequences of an issue, they 
are still emphasizing only whatever relieves the public in order to ensure the stability of the status 
quo. 
Meanwhile, there have been other frames used by the independent newspaper more than the 
governmental one. For example, the attribution of responsibility frame, which has been granted 
more space in the independent newspaper. The increased use of responsibility frame by the 
independent newspaper, however, has not pointed out the responsibility to the government. 
Instead, they have dropped out responsibility from the government to either foreign agents when 
Mubarak was in power, or terrorists when Sisi was in power. This suggests that although the 
independent press does not commit the pitfalls of the governmental press (directly praising the 
government), the journalists of the independent press are still loyal to the government, and they 
still conceal its failures. There have also been other frames that were used more by the 
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governmental newspaper. For example, the war on terror frame, whereby journalists linked the 
attacks to terrorists with global reach like Al Qaeda under Mubarak’s regime, and ISIS under Sisi’s 
regime. The use of this frame often emphasized the necessity of fighting terrorism whatever the 
costs are, and the demand for patriotic allegiances, as well as the need for special power for war 
against terrorism. 
The study has also looked into the use of different sources in the press coverage of the attacks. 
The results suggest that the most attributed sources in the press coverage of anti-Coptic attacks 
have been official sources, both local and international. This actually supports the previous 
findings of Sigal (1973), Palez et. al (1982), Manoff and Schudson (1987), Atwater and Green 
(1988), Wittebol (1996), and Kothari (2010). Although official sources are perceived among the 
public as sources with high credibility, the increased use of official sources comes at the expense 
of others who also need to have their voice heard. Journalists must give more attention to other 
sources like ordinary citizens or experts, who have been clearly under-represented in news about 
the attacks. For example, if journalists took the time to interview more terrorism experts, they 
would have provided the public with valuable information and interpretations about why the 
attacks against Copts have been recently increasing, what should the public do to avoid these 
attacks, and who should be held responsible. Economic experts would have also been beneficial 
sources for explaining the economic implications of such tensions, and providing accountable 
solutions for whatever negative implications these attacks hold.  
The effects of attributed sources on the frames in each news story have also been examined in 
the study. The results suggest that some sources do have an impact on the frames used. For 
example, stories with official sources were more likely to use the war on terror frame. Also the 
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human interest frame was more present in stories that attribute witnesses. Meanwhile, the morality 
frame was more present in stories that attribute religious leaders.  
The difference in frames used throughout different ruling regimes has also been apparent in 
the study. During Mubarak’s era, the most common frame used has been the morality frame. This 
might pertain to the fact that Mubarak always saw that he was unchallenged. However, he has 
finally realized that the attacks against Copts jeopardize his power and the current status quo. This 
is why he wanted to stabilize the situation by choosing the way that Egyptians would mostly adhere 
to without any doubts or questioning, which is the religious discourse. On the other hand, the most 
common frame under Sisi’s regime has been the war on terror frame. This might pertain to the fact 
that Sisi has gained a huge support from the Egyptian Copts when he came into power. To maintain 
this support, his main premise has been the promotion of national unity and equality between 
Muslims and Christians to fight terrorism threats. The difference of frames during different ruling 
periods reflect that the discourse of both the governmental and the Egyptian press are directly 
influenced by the ruling regime to the favor of whoever is in power.  
The study has also examined whether the blame placement differ during different ruling 
regimes. The results of the study have indicated that during both Mubarak’s and Sisi’s regimes, 
the highest percentage of news coverage have not included any blame placement. However, the 
second most common attribution of blame differed across different governments. For example, 
under Mubarak’s rule, the news stories blamed the attack on foreign agents who have been 
perceived as the country’s enemies. On the other hand, under Sisi’s rule, the attacks have been 
blamed on terrorists who felt threatened by the success of Sisi’s administration. 




 The political bias of both governmental and independent newspapers: The portrayal of anti-
Coptic attacks in both the governmental and independent outlets usually reflected the state 
officials’ perspective instead of the peoples’ perspectives. Both outlets have failed to 
address the security gaps and the deterioration in protecting the rights of minorities in 
Egypt. There has barely been any criticism to the state, the police or the military’s response 
to the attacks; instead, they have often been praised for their great efforts in securing the 
churches and saving the lives of the victims.  
 The concealment of the reality of violence against Coptic Christians, and the propagation 
of conspiracy: the attacks have been frequently portrayed in both media outlets as unusual 
events committed either by outsiders who are perceived as the Egyptians’ enemies, or by 
those who want to destabilize the country’s current status quo. It has been obvious that the 
Egyptian press has refrained from reflecting the broad societal division in Egypt. 
 Externalizing the blame: It has been obvious that the anti-Coptic attacks have been framed 
in terms of the national unity among Muslims and Christians, with foreign agents, or hostile 
terrorist groups identified as the perpetrators who seek the disturbance of such national 
unity. This can actually reflect the tendency of the Egyptian press to redirect away the focus 
from the secular tensions and also from the role of the government and its policies in 
promoting violence against Egyptian Copts.  
Clearly, the media tend to have an important role in the development of the country’s future, 
especially in times of crisis like the sectarian violence in Egypt. Whether these contributions are 
negative or positive depends on several factors like the extent of freedom of speech as well as the 
journalists’ commitment to objectivity and social responsibility. Therefore, the journalists must 
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refrain from providing biased, or misleading coverage in order to conceal some failure and gaps 
of the governments’ efforts to secure the Egyptian Copts.  
 
6.3 Limitations 
One of the limitations for this study is that the results are only relevant to the content type and 
the time frame chosen in the sampling process. The researcher has also been unable to include 
more newspapers to the sample chosen. Therefore the results cannot be generalized beyond this 
scope. Moreover, the researcher has looked only into news articles, hence, the results cannot be 
applied to opinion articles. The results have also been limited to the content of newspapers, 
disregarding any other media outlet that might be effective as well. Furthermore, the research has 
been limited to describing the frames in the communication content. Therefore, other relevant 
research methods might be considered to test the effects of such frames on the audience.  
 
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
     Future research should address the difference between the print media and the new media in 
framing anti-Coptic attacks, as the social media is becoming more influential. It is also suggested 
to use the findings of the present study as preliminary data for further research that tackle the 
effects of framing anti-Coptic attacks on the audience’s perception of the government’s 
performance, as well as Muslim Coptic relations in Egypt.  
It might also be beneficial to compare between framing anti-Coptic attacks in the Egyptian 
media and the international media, since the international media would be less biased towards the 
regime. Finally, further research should provide more insights and in-depth information on how 
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news sources affect frame building. This could be done by using qualitative methods like in-depth 
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CHAPTER 8: APPENDICES  
Appendix (A): The Code Book 
 Coder ID: 
1= Esraa, 2= Nihal, 3= Sarah 
 Newspaper name: 
1= Al Ahram, 2= Al Masry Elyoum 
 Date: mm/dd/yyy 
 Story position: 
1= front page, 2= inside page, 3= last page 
 The name of the attack 
1= The "Two Saints" attack in Alexandria 
2= The "Coptic Cathedral" attack in Cairo 
3= The "Saint George" attack in Tanta 
4= The "Saint Mark" attack in Alexandria 
5= Both "Saint George" and "Saint Mark" attacks 
 The title of text:  
 The ruling regime: 
1= Mubarak, 2= Sisi 
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 Journalistic style:  
1= descriptive style, 2= Interpretative style 
 What is the key issue of the news story?  
1= The attack itself 
2= Victims of the attack 
3= The government's reaction to the attack 
4= The Egyptian public's reaction to the attack 
5= The international community's reaction to the attack 
6= The religious leaders' reaction to the attack 
7= Terrorism 
8= The Muslim Coptic relations in Egypt 
9= Others (If you choose other, please specify) 
 Please, answer the following questions and fill out the code sheet  
YES=1 NO=0 
 Conflict frame  
1. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties-individuals-groups-countries?  
2. Does one party-individual-group-country reproach another?  
3. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the attacks? 
 Human interest frame 
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1. Does the story provide a human example, or human face on the attacks?  
2. Does the story use adjectives or personal stories that generate feelings of sympathy, 
outrage, caring or compassion?  
3. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the attacks?  
4. Does the story go into the private, personal lives of the actors?  
5. Does the story include visual information that might generate feelings of sympathy, 
outrage, caring or compassion? 
 Attribution of responsibility frame 
1.  Does the story suggest that some level of the government has the ability to alleviate the 
attacks?  
2. Does the story suggest that some level of the government is responsible for the attacks?  
3. Does the story suggest that an individual, or group of people are responsible for the 
attacks?  
4. Does the story suggest solutions to the attacks? 
 Morality frame 
1. Does the story contain any moral message?  
2. Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?  
3. Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave? 
 
 Economic consequences frame 
1. Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future? 
2.  Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved?  
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3. Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of 
action? 
 War on terror frame  
1. Does the story link the attack to terrorists with global reach (ISIS, Al Qaeda..etc)?  
2. Does the story emphasize on the fight against terrorism?  
3. Does the story call for special powers for wartime, or demand patriotic allegiance?  
 Frame context 
        1= Thematic 
        2= Episodic 
 What are the sources used in the news story? 
National official source: 1= Yes, 0= No 
International official source: 1= Yes, 0= No 
Witness: 1=Yes, 0=No 
Expert: 1= Yes, 0=No 
Religious leader: 1=Yes, 0=No 
Terrorism perpetrator: 1= Yes, 0= No 
People who are related to the perpetrator: 1= Yes, 0=No 
Not mentioned: 1= Yes, 0= No 
Other: 1= Yes, 0= No (If you choose other, please specify) 
 Who was blamed for the attacks? 
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1= The government 
2= Islamic groups 
3= Terrorists 
4= Suicide bomber 
5= Foreign agent 
6= No blame placement 





Appendix (B): Table of Acronyms  
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
IDSC Information and Decision Support Center 
ISIS The Islamic State Group  
 
 
